









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Desai, P. (2021). Essays in corporate finance and innovation. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.

























Essays in Corporate Finance 
and Innovation












Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University                                               
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. W.B.H.J. van de Donk, in het openbaar                                
te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college                                                                                    
voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de Aula van de Universiteit                                                            
op dinsdag 12 januari 2021 om 13.30 uur 
door 
 
Pranav Pradeep Desai, 
 













Promotores: prof. dr. O.G. Spalt (Tilburg University) 
prof. dr. F. Braggion (Tilburg University) 
 
  




leden promotiecommissie: prof. dr. L.T.M. Baele (Tilburg University) 
prof. dr. B.C.G. Dierynck (Tilburg University) 
dr. M. Porras Prado (Nova University Lisbon) 





























©2021 Pranav Pradeep Desai, The Netherlands. All rights reserved. No parts of this thesis 
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means 
without permission of the author. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag 
worden vermenigvuldigd, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke 




1 Biased Regulators: Evidence from Patent Examiners 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1 Patent prosecution process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.2 Examiner Incentives and Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.1 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.2 Sample Splits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1 Evidence from Patent Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5.3 Patent Prosecution Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.7 Costs of Biased Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.7.1 Patent Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.7.2 Effects on Startups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.A Variable Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.B Matching Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.C Example of a Patent Application Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2 Attention-Induced Information Dry-Ups 44
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.1 Shareholder Distraction Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.1 Shareholder Distraction and Analyst Forecast Quality . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.2 Shareholder Distraction and Analyst Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.3 Shareholder Distraction in Other Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1
3 Gender Gap in Punishing Failure: Evidence from U.S. Patent Applications 67
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 Institutional Background and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2.1 Examination Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.2 Effect of Rejection on Treatment of Other Female Inventors . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.3 Independent Inventors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.4 Firm and Inventor-level Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.5 Effect on Innovative Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.A Variable Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2
Acknowledgements
Throughout the world sounds one long cry from the heart of the artist: Give me the
chance to do my very best!
- Babette’s Feast (1987)
This thesis is the outcome of my PhD years, which were the most challenging yet exciting
years of my life. I would therefore like to thank the many different people who afforded me the
opportunities and gave me the chance to do my very best in producing this dissertation.
First, I would like to thank my advisor Oliver Spalt, who repeatedly pushed me to think hard
about my research, and constantly challenged me with his intellectually deep and unforgiving
questions. I am also thankful to Stefano Cassella and Fabio Braggion, whose support was
invaluable, especially during the final stages of completing this thesis. I am highly indebted to
Elisabeth Kempf, who patiently mentored me and taught me what it means to be a productive
researcher.
Next, I would like to express my gratitude to Melissa Prado, Bart Dierynck, Lieven Baele,
and Luc Renneboog for providing me with detailed and insightful comments on the chapters of
my thesis. I appreciate the time spent by them in reading my dissertation.
I would like to extend a warm thanks to all the Faculty members of the Finance Department
for providing me with rigorous training over the past few years, in all matters research and non-
research-related. I am particularly grateful to Rik Frehen who always gave me pragmatic and
kind advice, and Marco DaRin who took a special interest in my development during my PhD.
I must thank Loes, Helma, Marie-Cecile, Ank, and Cecile for their administrative support;
Camille and Peter for their job market advice; and Emiel, Kristy, Martijn, Farah, and Yuexin
for the many conversations we shared during my PhD journey. I am indebted to all the Faculty
members and staff of the Department for their support during the job market process.
I am truly fortunate to have friends who gave me consistently wise advice, tolerated me at
my worst, and helped me be my best self: Sanjana for always lending me a sympathetic ear and
for her ‘goal oriented’ approach towards solving problems; Georgi for his reminders to not push
myself too hard and that a life outside work also exists; Vilma for being the voice of reason and
for the impromptu walks; and Ashwini for sharing her kind and intelligent views on a range of
topics. I am genuinely grateful to Aditya, Shreya, and all my other friends for their patience
and generosity towards me.
Last but not least, I owe my immense gratitude to my family: my mother for her tough love
and for her fighting spirit which has not shown any signs of diminishing over time; my sister, for
3
setting an example for me, through her grit and determination in achieving all that she has; and
my father for providing me with all the support over the years. Without their unconditional
love and their personal sacrifices, I would never have had the opportunity to embark on this
PhD journey. I, therefore, dedicate my thesis to them!
4
Introduction
This Ph.D. dissertation consists of three independent chapters in corporate finance and innova-
tion. The first chapter studies how biases of patent examiners - an important set of regulators
- affect their decisions to grant patents. The second chapter studies how investor attention
affects analyst coverage of firms. The last chapter documents differences in how firms punish
male and female inventors for “as-good-as-random” creative failures.
The first chapter titled Biased Regulators: Evidence from Patent Examiners, poses
the question: Are regulators biased? The answer to this question has first-order economic
implications. Nearly every economic activity is subject to governmental regulation and the au-
thority to implement these rules often lies with individual regulators who possess considerable
discretion in implementing them. In this chapter, I show that cognitive biases influence regula-
tory actions by studying the decisions of patent examiners, who decide whether or not to grant
patents to inventors. By constructing a detailed dataset that links examiners to their patent
approval decisions, I show that examiners are more likely to grant patents to inventors of their
own race and gender. My research design exploits the random assignment of examiners to in-
ventors, ensuring that my findings are not affected by quality of the applications. These results
have implications for the patenting process in the United States and more broadly, document
a new driver of the under-participation of minorities and women in innovation.
The second chapter, Attention-Induced Information Dry-Ups, examines how institu-
tional investor attention affects analyst coverage of firms. While the effects of limited investor
attention on corporate governance and investment have been well documented, the implications
for the information provision to financial markets remain largely unexplored. This chapter pro-
vides novel causal evidence that institutional investor attention matters for analyst effort as
well as the quality of their earnings forecasts. Specifically, I show that when investors “shift”
their attention away from a firm, analysts correspondingly re-allocate their effort within their
portfolios away from the said company. This translates into worse quality forecasts for firms
with lower investor attention. These results suggest that when the demand of information
reduces, the supply of information from the intermediaries is likely to “dry-up” as well.
The third chapter, Gender Gap in Punishing Failure: Evidence from U.S. Patent
Applications, examines whether firms “punish” their female employees for creative failures
to a greater extent than their male counterparts. My analysis focuses on early stage inventors
who are making their first patent application to the USPTO and tracks their career outcomes
after they experience an “as-good-as-random” failure. To identify these failures, I exploit the
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variation in the likelihood of patent examiners to grant a patent. I show that when female
inventors, as compared to their male colleagues, fail to obtain a patent, they are more likely
to experience a job separation, less likely to find another job, and have a higher probability of
exiting innovation. Strikingly, these differences are not observed among independent inventors,
that is those inventors who are not employed by a firm. An important implication of this study
is that differential treatment of early stage female creative professionals by their employers




Biased Regulators: Evidence from
Patent Examiners
1.1 Introduction
Regulatory officials matter for nearly every economic activity: they control market entry and
exit, levy costly fines, and enforce penalties against firms and investors. Thereby, the distri-
bution of resources among market participants depends critically on how individual regulators
implement written rules. Unsurprisingly, a key tenet of fair regulatory decision-making is non-
discrimination (United States Government, 2013). That is, officials are expected to decide
without favoring a given social group over any other. But are regulators unbiased? Under-
standing whether officials exhibit in-group favoritism is important from both economic and
policy perspectives. If regulators discriminate on group characteristics, their actions might be
detrimental to the welfare of affected individuals. More importantly, their biased decisions may
distort the allocation of resources and be costly to the economy as a whole. In spite of this,
little work exists that identifies regulatory in-group biases and analyzes consequences thereof.
I aim to fill this gap by investigating the decisions of an important set of regulatory agency
employees: patent examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Studying examiners is economically relevant, because their decisions to grant patents are central
to incentivizing innovation (Nordhaus, 1969). Furthermore, examiner grant decisions have first-
order economic implications for startups (Gans et al., 2008; Farre-Mensa et al., 2020), firm R&D
investments (Budish et al., 2015), follow-on innovation (Moser, 2005, 2013; Williams, 2013;
Galasso & Schankerman, 2014; Sampat & Williams, 2019), technological progress (Merges &
Nelson, 1994), and economic growth (Jaffe & Lerner, 2011).
A test of regulatory in-group biases poses two key challenges. First, matches between
officials and regulated parties are often correlated to case quality. In the context of the Patent
Office, examiners might choose cases which improve their career outcomes. Similarly, inventors
may target officials who are more likely to decide in their favor (Fleischer, 2010). Second,
regulatory decisions cannot be typically linked to individual officials. This is reflected in the
lack of publicly available decision-level datasets on regulators.
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I tackle these challenges using unique institutional features of the Patent Office. First, I
exploit random assignment of cases to examiners within each department or “art unit”. Specif-
ically, I compare average grant rates for applications where the inventor and the examiner
belong to the same social group, with those where they belong to different groups. As the
determination of matches is orthogonal to application quality, this identification approach can
isolate the causal effects of examiners’ in-group biases on their decisions. To circumvent the
second challenge, I hand-collect biographical information on examiners and inventors, and de-
duce their race and gender using their names. I combine this information with data that link
individual examiners to their decisions during the patent application process. Overall, I observe
decisions of 13,000 unique examiners on about 1.8 million applications filed by teams consisting
of 2.5 million inventors between 2001 and 2018.
I present three new findings: (i) in-group biases affect examiners’ patent grant decisions;
(ii) examiners approve lower quality applications submitted by in-group inventors; and (iii)
discrimination by examiners reduces formation of new startups as well as their likelihood of
raising venture capital and going public.
I begin by showing that examiners are less likely to approve patents filed by an out-group
inventor, compared to those submitted by an in-group inventor. Specifically, patent grant rate
is 6 pp lower when the first inventor on the application is from another race. Relative to the
average approval rate of 67.7%, this represents a striking and economically sizable 8.8% lower
probability of receiving a patent. Similarly, examiners are 5 pp less likely to grant a patent when
the lead inventor belongs to another gender. When examiners do issue patents to out-group
inventors, they reduce the scope of novel claims therein. Together, this evidence suggests that
examiner biases meaningfully impact both the applicant’s chance of obtaining a new patent, as
well as the content of the granted patent.
My empirical approach ensures that the results are robust to several alternative expla-
nations. Inclusion of art unit × application year fixed effects mitigate concerns based on
technological trends, racial or gender composition of art units, and inventors’ choice of tech-
nology. Examiner and inventor fixed effects account for factors such as inventor skill, ability,
or examiner leniency. Firm fixed effects control for time-invariant differences across firms filing
patent applications. Finally, a battery of robustness checks rule out explanations based on the
examiner’s motivation to be hired by the firm filing on behalf of the inventor.
In the second step of my analysis, I examine the effect of biased grant decisions on quality of
issued patents. Indeed, if examiners are biased, they might be more lenient towards inventors
from their social groups, adopting a lower selection criteria. Hence, I pose the question: do
examiners approve worse quality applications from in-group inventors? To address this question,
I use measures of quality based on citations made and received by the patent. Overall, I find
that patents issued to in-group inventors receive fewer citations, are less innovative, and have
lower potential to encourage follow-on innovation.
The above findings suggest that examiners’ biases play a crucial role in determining the
distribution of patents among inventors. Given the effort involved in innovating and the cost
of filing a patent, this evidence is important from the perspective of individual inventors. Yet,
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these findings have little power to inform us on the wider economic effects of biased decisions.
Hence, in the final step of the analysis, I estimate the effects of biases on firms’ outcomes
during different stages of their life-cycle: from startup formation to going public. Inventors
matched to an examiner of a different race are 22% less likely to form new startups, relative to
the average applicant. Examiner biases affect startups’ access to external capital as well. Firms,
whose first patent application is assigned to an examiner of a different race are 8 pp less likely
to raise venture capital (VC) in the year after the patent grant decision. The effect is persistent
as firms experience lower VC funding into the fifth year after the examiner decision. Finally,
these startups face a lower likelihood of going public through an Initial Public Offering (IPO),
thereby, restricting their access to public equity. In sum, these results indicate that replacing
an in-group examiner with an out-group examiner leads to significantly worse outcomes for the
applicant startups.
Collectively, this paper provides the first systematic evidence of in-group biases in decision-
making by regulatory agency employees. Thereby, I make three contributions to the literature.
First, I add to the literature on the effects of group-based social biases in financial settings
(e.g. Wolfers (2006), Niessen & Ruenzi (2007), Kumar (2010), Kumar et al. (2015), Jannati
et al. (2018)). While most of these papers focus on private economic agents such as investors,
mutual fund managers, and analysts, I show that regulatory officials are susceptible to social
biases as well. Public officials differ in that they neither face market competition nor are
subject to discretionary firing - forces that might reduce biases in decision-making (Becker,
1957). In a broader sense, I address what Malmendier (2018) highlights as an important gap
in behavioral finance: the lack of evidence on cognitive biases among “third parties” who shape
the interactions between market participants1. By documenting the presence of in-group biases
among patent examiners, I also provide direct empirical evidence in support of the hypotheses
laid out by Hirshleifer (2008) and Hirshleifer & Teoh (2010) that regulatory decisions deviate
from the rational norm.
Second, I contribute to a growing literature that studies the effect of discrimination on
firms (Szymanski, 2000; Hellerstein et al., 2002; Kawaguchi, 2007; Weber & Zulehner, 2014). A
closely related paper, Huber et al. (2019) shows that forced removals of Jewish firm managers
due to antisemitic Nazi German policies caused reductions in stock prices and market value for
large firms. My study, on the other hand, provides contemporary evidence that discrimination
by individual public officials also affects firm formation and is costly for smaller, newer firms.
Moreover, Huber et al. (2019) document economic losses in a setting of institutionalized anti-
semitism. However, my results indicate that officials discriminate, even when they are expected
to decide under a non-discriminatory norm.
Finally, my results contribute to the discussion on underrepresentation of racial minorities
and women in innovation (Murray & Graham, 2007; Cook & Kongcharoen, 2010; Hunt, 2016;
Bell et al., 2018). Jensen et al. (2018), for instance, focus on the Patent Office, and find that
women on average face worse patenting outcomes. I point to a new factor that might drive
these documented disparities: discrimination by individual examiners. My findings also have
1See Baker & Wurgler (2013) and Malmendier (2018) for detailed surveys of this literature
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important policy implications for the debate on the efficiency of the patenting system (Merges,
2001; Lichtman, 2004; Moser, 2005; Jaffe & Lerner, 2011). Though research on this topic has
focused on the design and overall welfare impact of the patenting process, I highlight the role
of patent examiners in distorting the distribution of patents among inventors.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe the patent prosecution
process and my empirical approach, respectively. Section 1.4 explains the data construction in
detail. Section 1.5 presents the main results on patent grant decisions. Section 1.6 sheds light
on the mechanism. Section 1.7 provides evidence on effects on patent quality and startups.
Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Patent prosecution process
The USPTO - in its role as a federal regulatory agency - grants patents, which are economically
important rights to rents from innovations. Between 2001 and 2018, approximately 8 million
applications were received by the Patent Office, highlighting the scale of its operations. The
patent office operates under the principle that “all patents are created equal” (Merges, 2001).
Therefore, decisions on these applications are to be made by examiners in a highly-structured
process and under a strictly non-discriminatory norm.
The ‘patent prosecution process’ begins with the submission of an application by an inventor
or a team of inventors to the USPTO. These applications are sorted and forwarded to a rele-
vant art unit, with each unit specializing in a particular technology. The Supervisory Patent
Examiner (SPE) then allocates application files among examiners in the unit. Importantly,
there is no systematic sorting of applications whereby certain files are assigned to particular
examiners (Lemley & Sampat, 2012). This results in a quasi-random matching of applicants
and examiners to each other.
Each application consists of a set of claims. For instance, in a patent application related
to the iPhone, Steve Jobs and his team of inventors claimed a “computer-implemented method
for use...with a touch screen display(...)” (Jobs et al., 2009). The primary task of the examiner
is to decide whether to issue a patent or not, based on her evaluation of the novelty, usefulness,
and non-obviousness of the inventors’ claims.
To do so, the examiner searches for prior “art”, that is, patents and non-patent literature
such as scientific articles, which might be related to the claims made by the applicants. Often,
applicants themselves include some references in their applications. The examiner combines
information from her own search with references provided by applicants and determines whether
the application contains new and non-obvious patentable claims. Examiners usually issue an
initial “non-final rejection” citing problems with the claims. At this stage, applicants can
respond by amending or removing the claims i.e. narrowing the scope of the application. The
examiner can grant these modified claims and issue a patent, or issue a “final rejection”. Even
upon receiving a final rejection, the applicants can further modify their claims or dispute the
rejection. This prosecution process continues until, eventually, the examiner issues a patent
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or the inventors abandon their application2. In addition to granting or rejecting patents, the
examiner has considerable influence in determining the scope and number of claims in the issued
patent.
It is additionally important to note that inventors’ identity, especially, that of the lead
inventor is revealed to the deciding examiner during the prosecution process.3 While exam-
iners do often meet inventors in-person or through telephone interviews, an important piece
of information about inventors available to the examiners is their names (Jensen et al., 2018).
Hence, despite the non-discriminatory policy of the USPTO, examiners can infer gender, race,
and other characteristics of inventors from their names.
1.2.2 Examiner Incentives and Discretion
Patent examiners play a central role in implementing the United States Patent Law. They
are highly-specialized in the subject of their respective art unit and typically, have at least a
bachelor’s degree in scientific disciplines, often receiving further intensive training at the Patent
Office.
Examiners are hired and paid as per the “GS” i.e. the government pay scale (GS-5, GS-7,
GS-9, or GS-11). They are primarily rewarded with bonuses or promotions along this scale based
on the number of decision “counts” and their experience. This system does not account for the
time spent on applications, the diligence in search for prior art, or even rejections. Examiners
are thereby potentially incentivized towards approving applications and accumulating a higher
decision count (Jaffe & Lerner, 2011; Lemley & Sampat, 2012).
Junior examiners at the USPTO are subject to supervision by more senior examiners, as
their applications need to be signed by SPEs. Yet, in practice, there is limited oversight of
decisions made by junior examiners. As noted by Tabakovic & Wollmann (2018), SPE’s own
performance reviews are based on decision counts of their respective art units and they are
occupied with their own cases. Consequently, they rarely reject applications forwarded to them
by examiners under their supervision. This, in turn, provides junior examiners with substantial
discretion in making decisions on patent applications.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
Identifying whether patent examiners discriminate on the basis of racial or gender characteris-
tics of inventors is empirically challenging. First, examiners’ decisions on patent applications
are motivated by factors beyond inventor identity, including the underlying quality of the appli-
cations, the amount of time available to the examiners, and career concerns (Lemley & Sampat,
2012; Tabakovic & Wollmann, 2018). Second, in typical regulatory settings, matches between
regulated parties and decision-making authorities are not determined randomly. In the context
2The applicants can also file continuation or divisional applications in case of a final rejection. Additionally,
since 2012, inventors have been able to appeal the examiner’s decision with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB).
3See example of an application form in Appendix 1.C.
11
of patent examination, examiners might choose applications that are easier to evaluate to in-
crease their decision count. Conversely, inventors might tailor their applications such that they
are sent to art units with a higher proportion of lenient examiners. Finally, both the nature
of the prosecution process and the content of applications varies significantly, complicating
comparison between cases.
My identification strategy resolves these issues by exploiting the quasi-random assignment
of inventors to examiners. Specifically, I compare grant rates for applications where the inventor
and examiner belong to same social group, with those where they belong to different groups. As
the determination of matches between inventors and examiners is “as good as” random, I can
study whether examiners treat in-group inventors more favorably by analyzing the differences
between the two sets of applications. This empirical setup ensures that any disparity observed
in grant rates cannot be fully explained by the quality of applications. Additionally, since the
content of the application and the year of submission are chosen by applicants, I always include
art unit × application year fixed effects. Thus, I compare applications submitted in the same
year to a given art unit, controlling for time-varying differences between art units such as the
proportion of lenient examiners, racial and gender composition of art units, and average grant
rates.
Empirically, I estimate:
Grantijat = βmismatchij + γXijat + ζat + ϵijat (1.1)
where Grantijat is an indicator variable equal to one if examiner i approves the application
submitted by inventor j in application year t, and zero otherwise, Mismatchij is an indicator
equal to one when the examiner and the first inventor belong to the same social group and
zero otherwise, and ζat denote art unit × application year fixed effects. Xijat is a vector of
controls that includes examiner decision count, firm size, foreign priority status, and a dummy
indicating whether the application is made by non-US entities.
The parameter of interest in equation (3.1) β should be negative and statistically significant,
when examiners systematically show in-group favoritism. In this framework, Grantijat captures
the main decision made by the examiner on an application, that is whether to issue a patent or
not. Thereby, it provides the benchmark for comparing applications with substantially different
prosecution processes. Inventor, unless specified, refers to the first or lead inventor on the patent
application. I focus on the first inventor mainly due to the salience of her name and address
in the application form and in later correspondence. I show that the group characteristics of
lower ranked inventors do not affect patent grants, in robustness tests in table 5.
To isolate the effect of in-group biases further, I present specifications with examiner and
inventor fixed effects. Examiner fixed effects address concerns that examiner background, ex-
perience, seniority, or leniency might affect the estimates. Similarly, inclusion of inventor fixed
effects rules out explanations based on time-invariant inventor characteristics such as ability or
skill. I control for time-invariant characteristics of the firms to whom the application is assigned,
via “assignee” or firm fixed effects. As observations are unlikely to be independent within de-
partment and for applications submitted in the same year, standard errors are reported with
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double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Sources
Implementing the approach detailed in section 1.3 requires a dataset which (i) links individual
patent examiners to their decisions on applications filed by inventors, and (ii) contains infor-
mation on racial and gender characteristics of both examiners and inventors. While the Patent
Examination (PatEx) dataset contains data on examiner decisions, information on the race and
gender of individuals is not readily available (Graham et al., 2018a). Furthermore, for accurate
classification by race or gender, I need to resolve two main issues in the PatEx dataset: first, in-
formation on examiner backgrounds, that is, their state or country of origin is not recorded and
second, inventors are not uniquely identified. I overcome the first problem by hand-collecting
information on examiner backgrounds from LinkedIn, Martindale-Hubbell, and web searches.
I tackle the second issue by implementing a name disambiguation algorithm based on Li et al.
(2014) to distinguish between inventors with similar names. Using this data on inventors and
examiners, I perform a dictionary matching procedure which matches individuals to their race
and gender based on their names and location. The resulting dataset contains the detailed
information necessary to analyze how examiner decisions are influenced by racial and gender
characteristics of the applicant. I describe the full data construction in detail below.
The starting point of assembling this dataset is the information on applications from the
Patent Examination (PatEx) database. PatEx dataset contains the names and unique identifiers
of examiners, decisions made by them during the prosecution process, and the names and
background information of inventors filing the application. This dataset is sourced by the
USPTO from application files in the Public Patent Application Information Retrieval (Public
PAIR) system.
I restrict my sample to utility patent applications filed between November 2001 and Febru-
ary 2018, because (i) data prior to this period is incomplete and (ii) the American Inventors
Protection Act (“AIPA”) passed in 1999 required all non-provisional patent applications filed
after December 2000 to be published. For issued patents, I consider observations between July
1995 and February 2018 to ensure complete coverage (Tabakovic & Wollmann, 2018). I re-
tain only those cases on which decisions are made, thereby excluding ‘placeholders’ such as
provisional, reissue, and patent cooperation treaty (PCT) applications. As the identification
approach of this study relies on the quasi-random assignment of applicants to examiners, I ex-
clude continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part wherein cases are often re-assigned
to the same examiner who reviews the original application (USPTO, 1983).
Next, I hand-collect biographical information on examiners from LinkedIn, databases on US
Government employees, and directories of patent practitioners such as Martindale-Hubbell.4
Specifically, I collect information on the employment histories of patent examiners as well as
4A large number of patent examiners work for patent practitioner firms after leaving the USPTO. Patent
practitioners are lawyers who file applications on behalf of the applicants.
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on their prior graduate, undergraduate, and high-school education, when available.
While the PatEx dataset contains information on the inventor’s address, state, and country,
one key issue, as discussed above, is that it is difficult to distinguish inventors with the same
name. For instance, two inventors with the name “John Smith” are not assigned unique identi-
fiers. I disambiguate this inventor dataset using the publicly posted algorithm provided by Li
et al. (2014), which uses a combination of location and names to identify inventors uniquely.
I use two dictionaries to classify race: the data on racial frequencies by last names in the
2000 and 2010 Census Surname Tables provided by the United States Census Bureau (Word
et al., 2008; Comenetz, 2016) and similar information on first names from Tzioumis (2018).5.
Using a fuzzy-matching procedure based, I am able to match 89.41% (2,516,347 out of 2,814,389)
unique inventors and 81.94% of (13,215 out of 16,127) examiners with non-missing names, to
their racial groups. I assign each individual to one of the six racial groups used by the United
States Census Bureau if the probability of both the first and the last name belonging to that
racial category is greater than 0.70. I repeat this procedure to classify gender using the state-
level data on frequency of names from the Social Security Administration (SSA). As above,
a name is assigned to a given gender when the percentage of names in the state belonging
to that gender is above 70%. Where a name cannot be matched to the SSA dataset and
for individuals based outside the United States, I use a cross-country dataset from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Lax Martínez et al., 2016). Overall, I am able to
match 92.58% (2,605,635 out of 2,814,389) of inventors and 87.88% (14,173 out of 16,127) of
examiners to their gender.
As seen in Table 1, I am able to track 1,372,257 (1,733,273) unique applications with com-
plete information on the race (gender) of both the examiner and the first inventor, and non-
missing control variables. The average patent grant rate in my sample is 67.7% . First-round
grant rates are much lower at 15.2%, consistent with findings in previous studies (Jensen et al.,
2018). More importantly for the purpose of this study, mismatches are not rare - with about
49.5% (33.5%) of all applications resulting in a racial (gender) mismatch.
In Panels C and D, I present the racial and gender composition of inventors and examiners.
Overall, most inventors are white and male, with Asian-Americans being the second largest
demographic. This especially holds true for inventors based in the United States. Similarly,
examiners at the USPTO typically belong to the Non-Hispanic White racial group and are
male. These findings are in line with the under-representation of ethnic minorities and women
in innovation documented in existing literature (Cook & Kongcharoen, 2010; Jensen et al.,
2018).
1.4.2 Sample Splits
Table 2 presents summary statistics for key variables when I split the sample by mismatches
between the social group of the examiner and the first inventor. Panels A and B report the
sorting results for racial and gender mismatches respectively. On average, patent grant rates
are higher when the examiner and inventor belong to the same social group. More interestingly,
5See Appendix 1.B for detailed information on the matching process
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the differences across subsamples are considerable (see Figure 1): the grant rate for a racial
match is approximately 9 pp higher relative to a mismatch, while the rate for a gender match
is about 3 pp higher.
Applications with a mismatch typically have lower first-round grant rates. Interestingly,
inventors are less likely to appeal against an out-group examiner’s decision, reducing their
prospects of obtaining a patent. Moreover, examiners spend less time deciding on applications
submitted by out-group inventors. These results provide preliminary evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that examiners show preferential treatment to members of their own social groups.
As these differences might be potentially explained by factors other than biased decisions of the
examiners, I re-evaluate this evidence using more rigorous regression analysis in Section 1.5.
The main identification assumption of this paper is that cases are assigned to examiners
quasi-randomly. While numerous studies have tested this assumption both empirically and
using examiner surveys (Lemley & Sampat, 2012), the simple sorts in the table provide further
supporting evidence. In particular, the two subsamples do not differ across key characteristics,
such as, whether the examiner has a higher decision count, the applicant has a prior patent in
a foreign jurisdiction, is based outside the United States, or the application is filed by a small
entity.
1.5 Main results
This section presents my main results. I first establish that examiners are more likely to
grant patents to inventors belonging to their racial group or gender. This result is robust to
alternative explanations based on firm quality and revolving doors. Then, I focus on approved
applications and document that examiners grant patents containing more claims and with wider
scope to in-group inventors. Finally, I show that the biases are particularly pronounced when
group identification is more salient. Together, these results suggest that in-group biases affect
examiner decisions.
1.5.1 Evidence from Patent Grants
Table 3 reports the results from estimation of equation (3.1). The findings indicate that exam-
iners are less likely to grant patents to lead inventors who do not belong to their social groups.
The result in column (1) of Panel A shows that a mismatch between the race of the inventor
and the examiner lowers the probability of an application being accepted by 2 pp. Even upon
tightening the identification by including examiner and inventor fixed effects in column (2),
a racial mismatch results in a 6 pp lower probability of a patent grant. The effect is 8.9%
(=6/67.7%) of the average approval rate and is therefore economically sizable. The economic
and statistical significance of the coefficient remains high when I include assignee fixed effects
in column (3) to rule out explanations based on time-invariant characteristics of the firm to
whom the patent is assigned. In Panel B, I repeat this analysis by focusing on gender as the
social group of interest. Here, I find that the effect is similarly large ranging from 3.4 pp to 6
pp lower chance of success in case of a gender mismatch.
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In Table 4, I expand upon this analysis by separately reporting grant rates for examiners
belonging to different social groups. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether the above
results are driven mainly by biased decisions of one group of examiners. Such a concern arises
from the fact that patent office employees are predominantly white and male. In Panel A, I
focus on decisions by examiners from the two largest racial groups in my sample - Non-Hispanic
Whites and Asians. Reassuringly, it is evident that both white and asian examiners are more
likely to favor in-group inventors. Similarly, in Panel B, male as well as female examiners are
more likely to issue patents to inventors of their own gender. The consistently higher grant
rates to in-group inventors by examiners across different social groups, in addition to the rich
set of controls and fixed effects also mitigate concerns that application quality might be driving
these results.
Overall, the findings in Table 3 and 4 suggest that in-group favoritism in examiner decisions
affects one of the main outcomes of the patent prosecution process, that is the issuance of a
patent.
1.5.2 Robustness
Table 5 presents a number of robustness tests. I report results for the specification in Table 3,
column (3) unless stated otherwise, and suppress all control variables for brevity. As in Table
3, I present estimates for both racial as well as gender mismatches. Panel A shows results for
inventors who are ranked lower in the application. Typically, a patent application is filed by
a team of inventors, while much of the analysis presented above focuses on the first inventor
listed in the application. Hence, I regress Grantijat on mismatches between the examiner and
inventors who appear second and third on the application respectively. Neither the gender nor
the race of lower ranked inventors appears to have a significant effect on examiner decisions,
with the size of the coefficient decreasing in accordance with the ranking of the inventor. This
suggests that examiner biases are primarily driven by the group characteristics of the most
salient inventor on the application.
In first line of Panel B, I employ an alternative measure of race and test the robustness of
the results in Panel A of Table 3. The examiner might be able to infer the race of the inventor
by the address listed directly below her name on the application form.6 Motivated by this,
I construct an alternative measure of race which is based on the racial demographics of the
Metropolitan State Area (MSA), as provided by the United Census Bureau 2000 Census. Here,
an inventor is assigned to the most common racial group in the MSA in which she resides.
I obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results even upon using this location-based
measure of race.
In the second line of Panel B, I consider whether team composition plays a role in obtaining
a patent successfully. Thereby, I construct
Panel C addresses concerns that these results might be affected by the willingness of the
examiner to seek employment with practitioners who file on behalf of the applicants (Tabakovic
& Wollmann, 2018). First, I include practitioner × examiner fixed effects to rule out the
6See Appendix 1.C for an example of a web-based application form.
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possibility that persistent links between the examiner and the law firm filing on behalf of the
inventors might drive these results. This equation is estimated without examiner fixed effects.
Second, I add a control variable to the baseline equation (3.1) that is equal to one if the MSA
where the lead inventor is based contains a practitioner office, and zero otherwise. Both the
results reported in Panel C indicate that the baseline result remains largely unchanged, despite
including practitioner-related fixed effects and control variable. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that an explanation based on “revolving doors” might be inducing the in-group favoritism
documented in Table 3.
In Panel D, I restrict the sample to applicants with addresses in the United States. With
this change in sample, the size of the coefficients increase both for racial as well as gender
mismatches. A potential explanation for this change might be that examiners are more familiar
with American names and thereby, more proficient at inferring their group characteristics.
In Panel E, I consider whether “ambiguous” names elicit the same biased responses from
the examiner. Specifically, I estimate the specification in Table 3, column (3) on a sub-sample
of first-ranked inventors, whose name belongs to a given racial or gender group with a prob-
ability between 40% and 60%. The coefficient in Panel E is much smaller in magnitude and
economically insignificant. This provides suggestive evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that the in-group biases of inventors are driven by name-based stereotyping.
Finally, in Panel F, I examine the role of inventor experience and applicant team charac-
teristics. In the first line, I include an additional control for inventor experience, which is the
natural logarithm of the number of patents successfully obtained by the inventor prior to the
focal application. In the second and third rows, I add controls for racial and gender composi-
tion of the team as well as for the prior patents obtained by other inventors on the applicant
team. In the last row, I include fixed effects for inventor teams. Overall, the results remain
unchanged even upon including a wide range of controls to account for other inventors with
whom the applicant produces the patent.
1.5.3 Patent Prosecution Outcomes
While patent grant is an important measure of the success of an application, examiners have
considerable influence over other outcomes during the process as well as on the final contents
of the patent itself. This section studies the impact of being assigned an out-group examiner
on early-stage rejections, time spent on deciding the outcome, as well as the claims allowed in
the issued patent.
Table 6 reports the results. I begin by considering non-final rejections by examiners. Though
non-final rejections are common7, the results are still informative in terms of the additional effort
required by inventors in the prosecution process. The second outcome is whether inventors are
likely to request a re-examination after receiving a final rejection. Re-examination is one of the
main methods by which inventors can appeal the examiner’s decision. Hence, this specification
provides an insight into whether the inventor decides to continue with the patenting process
after the final rejection. The third outcome I consider is the time spent by the examiner before
7In my sample, the rate of first round or non-final rejections is 84.8%.
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issuing the final decision. Thereafter, I focus on three variables which measure the quantity and
quality of claims in the issued patent. Reducing the number of claims in a patent, as reported
in column (4), might lower its economic value (Merges & Nelson, 1990). Reduced claims also
lengthen patents in terms of number of words as inventors have to cite more prior art (Quinn,
2015). Estimates on changes in word count are reported in column (5). In column (6), I use
patent scope - a measure of the number of words in the claims normalized at the art unit level
(Kuhn & Thompson, 2019). A higher patent scope corresponds to fewer words in claims.
All results in Table 6 consistently indicate that a racial or gender mismatch results in worse
patenting outcomes for the inventor. Specifically, examiners are less likely to issue a patent
in the first round to out-group inventors, while spending more time in decision-making. The
latter result is in stark contrast to the sorting estimates presented in Table 2. However, it is
important to note that the regression-based estimates are more rigorous, in that, they control
for time-invariant examiner and inventor-level factors. More importantly, inventors rejected
by an out-group examiner are less likely to file an appeal, thereby reducing their chances of
pursuing a patent after receiving a final rejection. In addition, a mismatch shapes the nature
of claims in the final patent. Both the number of claims as well as the scope of the patent
reduce, thereby, reducing its economic value for the applicant. As a broader patent is more
likely to be sold by the inventor, these changes might affect the overall probability of re-sale
as well (Kuhn, 2016). Together, results in Table 3 and Table 6 indicate that examiner biases
affect patent decisions at both the extensive and intensive margins.
1.6 Mechanism
The preceding section establishes that examiners treat inventors who are not from their in-
group less favorably. In this section, I attempt to provide direct evidence in support of the
interpretation that these results can be explained by examiner in-group favoritism. Specifically,
I test a central prediction of the social identity theory, that is, increased salience of group
membership intensifies in-group biases (Mullen et al., 1992). I also study whether examiners
are more likely to be biased when their cognitive load is higher.
First, I construct a variable - racial conflict, which proxies for the public attention to racial
discord in the United States. I begin by constructing a variable which is equal to one when
the negative media mentions of China are above median as compared to the sample period
and zero otherwise. A mention is classified as negative, when the term China appears with a
negative term in the headline of the newspapers Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los
Angeles Times and New York Post with negative terms being obtained from the Harvard IV
TagNeg dictionary. This measure is motivated by the previous findings that bias against Asian-
Americans is heightened during periods of increased negative mentions of China on social and
traditional news media (Darling-Hammond et al., 2020). Second, I identify whether examiners
are from a state which had passed Jim Crow laws in the past. Jim Crow laws were a collection of
laws passed primarily at the state or the county-level which legally enforced racial segregation.
My main conjecture is that individuals raised in states with a history of racial conflict might
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pay greater attention to the racial characteristics of the applicants, motivated by prior findings
of the literature that implicit racial biases are higher in these regions (Payne et al., 2019). I
define the variable - segregation state as being equal to zero, if the examiner’s earliest education
occurred in a state with a history of having passed Jim Crow Laws and zero otherwise.
Finally, I test an explanation based on the examiner’s cognitive load, as measured by her
workload during the application year. I test the hypothesis that examiners are more likely to
base their decisions on the salient characteristics of the case, such as the racial characteristics
of the inventor’s name, when they have less time to make their decision (Bordalo et al., 2015).
Here, I define examiner workload, as an indicator variable equal to one if the number of cases
pending with the patent examiner is above the median of her art unit in the application year,
and zero otherwise.
Table 7 presents analysis of the mechanism, wherein I interact these three measures with
racial mismatch. I observe that examiner in-group favoritism intensifies with increased attention
to racial conflict. Similarly, examiners from segregation states which have a history of racial
conflict, are more biased in their decision-making. On the other hand, increased case workload
does not appear to have an effect on examiner decisions when there is a racial mismatch. These
results further support my interpretation that the differences in patent outcomes documented in
this paper are driven by in-group biases. In contrast, the amount of time or cognitive resources
available to the examiner cannot explain these results.
1.7 Costs of Biased Decisions
The efficient allocation of patents is central to innovation and therefore, to overall economic
growth (Jaffe & Lerner, 2011). The evidence presented in this paper so far documents the
distortion in allocation of patents due to examiner biases. Still, it is unclear whether these
decisions have any wider economic effects. The goal of this section is therefore to get a sense
of the economic costs imposed by biased examiner decisions.
1.7.1 Patent Quality
I begin by analyzing the impact of biased grant decisions on the quality on patents, as measured
by their citations. Patent citations are typically associated with higher market value (Kuhn &
Thompson, 2019) and any reduction in patent quality might consequently lower their economic
value as well.
Table 7 provides insights into these effects by regressing measures of patent quality on
examiner-inventor mismatches. I first consider the number of citations received by a patent in
five years after issuance. This measure captures the impact of a patent in terms of generating
future innovations. My findings indicate that a patent resulting from a racial mismatch garners
0.93 more forward citations - an effect which is economically large at 20.23% (=0.093/0.459%)
of the unconditional mean. The effect is similarly large for a gender mismatch at 10.46%
(=0.048/0.459%) of the average.
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Similar patterns hold in the next three columns. On average, patents issued to an out-group
inventor are of better quality, in terms of the citations made to previous art, as well as generality,
and originality of the patent. The estimates in columns (3) and (4), are especially important,
given that generality and originality estimate the impact in terms of spurring innovation in a
wider number of fields and technological novelty relative to existing innovations, respectively
(Trajtenberg et al., 1997).
One potential interpretation of the above evidence is that examiners apply a lower thresh-
old to members of their own social groups, by approving worse quality and economically less
valuable patents. Another way to interpret these differences in patent quality is that inventors
with only the highest quality innovations proceed with their applications, when faced with an
out-group examiner. This view is consistent with self-selection in entry by minority groups due
to discrimination (Kumar, 2010). However, distinguishing between these two interpretations is
not possible using the average effects reported in Table 7. Nonetheless, these results do indi-
cate that patent quality is negatively affected due to in-group favoritism by examiners, as lower
quality and thus, economically less valuable patents from in-group inventors are accepted.
1.7.2 Effects on Startups
Beyond affecting the quality of patents, biased grant decisions might negatively impact the
participants in the patenting process as well. So, I shift the focus of my analysis to consider the
impact on the patenting firm during different stages of its life-cycle: from formation to raising
venture capital and then, going public. Patents are important for startups while accessing
external capital, whether through venture capital or through public offerings. The information
frictions involved in raising capital are especially high for newer firms. Patents ease this process
for startups, as they can either pledge their patenting rights as collateral while securing loans
or signal their quality through successful patent applications (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020).
I follow Farre-Mensa et al. (2020) in defining a startup, using data from Thomson One
VentureXpert. I begin by dropping firms based outside the United States and not-for-profit
entities like academic institutions and government agencies. To exclude large publicly listed
firms and their subsidiaries from the sample, I match firm names with company names in CRSP-
Compustat dataset and remove firms with a history of patenting, retaining mainly applicants
assigned the “small business entity” status by the USPTO. Using this newly constructed sample,
I identify the inventors who are involved in setting up new firms by matching inventor names
to names of individuals involved in founding startups. I also augment this dataset by hand-
collecting information on startup founders from LinkedIn.
I estimate equation (3.1), replacing the dependent variable with measures of firm outcomes.
I begin by focusing on the probability that an inventor whose first application was assigned to
an out-group examiner, starts a new firm in the five years after the examiner decision. This
helps me study the effect of a mismatch on formation of new firms by inventors. Next, I study
whether startups’ ability to raise venture capital is affected by a group mismatch on its first
application. Finally, I examine whether a startup’s transition to becoming a publicly listed firm
through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is affected by inventor-examiner mismatches.
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Table 9 reports the results. A racial mismatch reduces the inventors’ likelihood of setting up
a new firm by 1.1 pp. The economic magnitude of this effect is large at 22% (=1.1/5%) of the
unconditional mean. In other words, replacing an in-group examiner with an out-group exam-
iner significantly reduces the probability of an inventor becoming a startup founder. Columns
(2) to (6) highlight the impact of inventor-examiner mismatches on startups’ likelihood of rais-
ing venture capital. Specifically, when the first inventor on the application filed by the startup
belongs to a different race or gender than the examiner, the firm is less likely to obtain venture
capital. This effect is both statistically significant and persistent, lasting up to five years after
the decision on the first application. In column (7), I show that a mismatch has an impact on
the firm’s ability to raise external capital through an IPO by 0.6 pp. While this effect might
seem small prima facie, only 0.6% of the firms in my sample file an IPO between 2001 and 2018.
As the matches are determined quasi-randomly, other factors such as quality of the startup or
the application cannot fully explain these patterns. The combined evidence presented in Ta-
bles 7 and 9 suggest that examiner biases have economic costs beyond simply reducing patent
grant rates for out-group inventors: they also reduce patent quality and result in measurably
worse outcomes for the startup founders, newer firms, and more mature startups aiming to raise
external capital.
1.8 Conclusion
I show that in-group biases affect the decisions of an important set of regulatory agency em-
ployees: patent examiners. Using a novel hand-collected detailed dataset that links patent
examiners and inventors to their race and gender, I show that examiners are less likely to
grant patents to inventors who do not belong to their social group. My identification approach
exploits the quasi-random assignment of examiners to inventors, ensuring that differences in
quality of the applications cannot explain the results. Moreover, the findings are consistent
with the predictions of social identity theory: biases intensify when the salience of group mem-
bership increases. I further show that biased decisions by examiners have effects on patent
quality, startup formation, and the likelihood of new firms raising venture capital and going
public.
This paper contributes to the vigorous debate on the effects of regulations by focusing on
the decision-making officials who implement these rules. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first study to provide systematic causal evidence of discrimination in decisions by an
important set of regulatory agency employees: patent examiners. If sophisticated regulatory
decision-makers such as examiners are susceptible to biased decision making, it is likely that
these biases might influence the actions of other economically important regulators as well and
have important consequences both for the distribution of resources and rate of economic growth.
I leave exploring these effects in other settings to future research.
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FIGURE 1
Patent Acceptance Rates by Examiner-Inventor Matches
This graph plots the share of patent applications resulting in a grant for matches and mismatches by
race and gender between the patent examiner and the first inventor on the application. A mismatch
(match) is an application where the examiner and the first inventor both belong to different (same)
race or gender. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the difference between groups
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, with standard errors that allow for double-clustering at the




This table presents summary statistics for key variables. The sample in Panel A consists of all patent
applications between November 2001 and February 2018, while the sample in Panel B consists of all
issued patents between July 1995 and February 2018. In Panels C and D, the demographics of individual
examiners and inventors are presented. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1.
Panel A: All Applications
N Mean Std. Dev. 0.25 Median 0.75
Dependent Variables
Patent grant 1,733,273 0.678 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000
First round grant 1,733,273 0.152 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appealed 1,733,273 0.247 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000
Decision time 1,733,273 1078.720 444.832 743.000 1009.000 1348.000
Independent Variables
Racial mismatch 1,372,357 0.495 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Gender mismatch 1,733,273 0.335 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000
Control Variables
Foreign application 1,733,273 0.722 0.448 0.000 1.000 1.000
Small entity 1,733,273 0.237 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000
Examiner experience 1,733,273 6.791 1.397 6.064 7.011 7.808
Foreign priority 1,733,273 0.550 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000
Panel B: All Issued Patents
N Mean St. Dev. 0.25 Median 0.75
Dependent Variables
∆ number of claims 802,932 0.705 0.976 0.000 0.311 0.973
∆ words in claims 802,956 0.017 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000
Patent scope 535,522 -0.035 1.033 -0.462 0.169 0.637
Patent Quality
Forward citations 1,122,510 0.459 1.346 0.000 0.000 0.000
Backward citations 1,389,502 8.911 14.152 3.000 6.000 10.000
Generality 1,122,510 0.419 0.436 0.000 0.333 1.000
Originality 1,389,502 0.520 0.342 0.222 0.600 0.806
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Inventors (All) 2,516,347 60.99 2.70 0.07 36.24 0.00 0.00
Inventors (Only US) 1,185,781 91.60 2.15 0.07 6.17 0.00 0.00
Inventors (First-ranked) 960,117 59.58 2.50 0.07 37.84 0.00 0.00
Inventors (US and first-ranked) 420,967 91.84 2.05 0.07 6.05 0.00 0.00
Examiners 13,215 79.01 2.68 0.39 17.93 0.00 0.00
Panel D: Gender of Inventors and Examiners
N Male (%) Female (%)
Inventors (All) 2,605,635 83.99 16.01
Inventors (Only US) 1,466,188 86.30 13.70
Inventors (First-ranked) 892,222 85.56 14.44
Inventors (US and first-ranked) 574,307 87.50 12.50




This table reports sample splits by examiner-inventor matches for the main variables of interest. Panels
A and B present splits for matches between examiner and first inventor on the application based on race
and gender respectively. I report the sample average (All), the average when both examiner and inventor
belong to the same racial or gender group (Match), and the average when the examiner and inventor
do not belong to the same group (Mismatch), as well as the t-statistic for the difference between the
two subsamples. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. Reported t-statistics are based on standard
errors that allow for double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.
Panel A: Matches by Race (All Applications)
All Mismatch Match t-stat
Dependent Variables
Patent grant 0.677 0.632 0.721 2.53
First round grant 0.154 0.146 0.162 1.81
Appealed 0.245 0.241 0.248 4.09
Decision time 1074.289 1056.910 1091.350 10.55
Control Variables
Foreign application 0.743 0.852 0.636 -0.00
Small entity 0.237 0.198 0.275 1.43
Examiner experience 6.799 6.781 6.816 1.25
Foreign priority 0.570 0.684 0.459 -0.02
N 1,372,562 679,904 692,658
Panel B: Matches by Gender (All Applications)
All Mismatch Match t-stat
Patent grant 0.678 0.660 0.688 9.21
First round grant 0.152 0.149 0.154 5.86
Appealed 0.247 0.245 0.248 3.22
Decision time 1078.720 1073.620 1081.287 1.50
Control Variables
Foreign application 0.722 0.731 0.717 -1.01
Small entity 0.237 0.251 0.230 -0.53
Examiner experience 6.791 6.750 6.811 1.63
Foreign priority 0.550 0.554 0.548 -1.12
N 1,733,273 581,090 1,152,183
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TABLE 3
Examiner In-group Biases and Patent Grant Decisions
This table regresses patent grant decisions on group mismatch between examiner and first inventor in
the application. Panels A and B report results from mismatches by race and gender respectively. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the patent application resulted in a final grant
decision and zero otherwise. Racial (gender) mismatch is an indicator variable equal to one if the race
(gender) of the first inventor on the application is not the same as that of the patent examiner, and zero
otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors that allow for double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.
Panel A: Matches by Race
Patent Granted
(1) (2) (3)
Racial mismatch -0.020 -0.060 -0.051
(-2.09) (-5.93) (-3.38)
Foreign priority -0.044 -0.019 -0.006
(-9.13) (-3.67) (-1.51)
Foreign application -0.017 -0.012 -0.007
(-4.50) (-5.16) (-1.32)
Small entity -0.166 -0.129 -0.122
(-29.86) (-17.13) (-17.98)
Examiner experience 0.085 0.100 0.101
(33.65) (24.47) (24.52)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE No Yes Yes
Inventor FE No Yes Yes
Assignee FE No No Yes
N 1,372,030 939,495 612,074
R2 0.20 0.50 0.62
26
Panel B: Matches by Gender
Patent Granted
(1) (2) (3)
Gender mismatch -0.060 -0.050 -0.034
(-3.47) (-2.20) (-3.12)
Foreign priority -0.039 -0.020 -0.018
(-8.97) (-4.60) (-3.47)
Foreign application -0.023 -0.014 -0.012
(-6.54) (-7.43) (-5.30)
Small entity -0.167 -0.131 -0.129
(-30.14) (-17.01) (-16.41)
Examiner experience 0.085 0.100 0.100
(33.37) (25.45) (25.00)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE No Yes Yes
Inventor FE No Yes Yes
Assignee FE No No Yes
N 1,733,273 1,207,482 881,461
R2 0.11 0.20 0.50
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TABLE 4
Examiner In-group Biases in Patent Grant Decisions by Social Group
This table repeats the analysis in Table 3, but reports the results separately by group identities. Panel
A estimates the regression on the subsample of lead inventors and examiners who are either White or
Asian. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the patent application resulted
in a final grant decision and zero otherwise. White (Asian) examiner is an indicator variable equal to
one if the examiner belongs to the White (Asian) racial group. Similarly, White (Asian) inventor is
an indicator variable equal to one if the first inventor on the application belongs to the White (Asian)
racial group. Panel B repeats this analysis with gender as the social group of interest. Male (Female)
examiner is an indicator variable equal to one if the examiner is male (female). Male (Female) inventor
is an indicator variable equal to one if the first inventor on the application is male (female). t-statistics,
reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for double-clustering at the art unit
and application year level.







White examiner × Asian inventor -0.012
(-5.00)
Asian examiner × White inventor -0.090
(-3.90)
Foreign priority -0.043 -0.018 -0.018
(-8.16) (-3.38) (-3.37)
Foreign application -0.016 -0.011 -0.011
(-4.91) (-4.29) (-4.28)
Small entity -0.166 -0.129 -0.129
(-29.57) (-17.24) (-17.24)
Examiner experience 0.085 0.100 0.100
(33.62) (24.63) (24.63)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE No Yes Yes
Inventor FE No Yes Yes
N 739,504 680,441 680,441
R2 0.19 0.50 0.50
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Male examiner × Female inventor -0.010
(-2.19)
Female examiner × Male inventor -0.080
(-2.48)
Foreign priority -0.019 -0.010
(-4.16) (-4.23)
Foreign application -0.013 -0.014
(-6.79) (-6.74)
Small entity -0.131 -0.123
(-17.15) (-17.20)
Examiner experience 0.100 0.103
(25.51) (22.36)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE No Yes Yes
Inventor FE No Yes Yes
N 1,732,799 1,207,482 1,207,482




This table presents robustness tests. The baseline regression refers to specification (3) from Panels A
and B from Table 3. For brevity, I only report the main coefficients of interest without presenting the
coefficients of the control variables. Panel A tests grant rates by mismatches between the examiner and
lower ranked inventors on the patent application. Accordingly, the next two lines present the coefficients
for mismatch between the examiner, and second and third ranked inventors respectively. In Panel B,
I use an alternative measure of race. Here, an inventor is assigned to the race which constitutes the
majority in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) where she resides, as obtained from the US Census
Bureau. Thereby, a mismatch is defined as one if the race of the first-ranked inventor and the examiner
do not match and zero otherwise. In Panel C, first line, I add practitioner × examiner fixed effects,
where practitioner refers to the patent practitioner who represents the inventor team. Here, I estimate
the equation without examiner fixed effects. In the second line, I add a control which is defined as one
if the patent practitioner office is in the same state as the first inventor on the application. In Panel
D, I restrict the sample to first-ranked inventors who reside in the United States. In Panel E, I restrict
the sample to those individuals whose name is ambiguous. An ambiguous name is defined as one which
belongs to a given racial group or gender with a probability between 40% and 60%. Panel F re-estimates
the baseline specification with additional controls. In the first line, the specification is estimated with
a control for inventor experience, which is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of patents
successfully obtained by the inventor prior to the focal application. In the second line, a control is
added for team group characteristics, which is the percentage of inventors on the team who belong to
the examiner’s out-group, excluding the first inventor. In the third line, a control for team experience is
included, which is defined as the average of natural logarithm of number of patents successfully obtained
by inventors prior to the focal application, excluding the first inventor. In the final line, I add team fixed
effects.
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Matches by Race Matches by Gender
Coeff. t-statistic N Coeff. t-statistic N
Baseline -0.060 (-5.93) 939,495 -0.050 (-2.20) 1,207,482
Panel A: Alternative inventor rank
Second ranked inventor -0.005 (-1.33) 427,221 -0.003 (-0.82) 699,521
Third ranked inventor -0.002 (-0.54) 277,274 0.007 (1.35) 304,689




Panel C: Revolving doors
Practitioner × examiner FE -0.071 (-4.55) 396,571 -0.050 (-3.21) 392,999
Practitioner offices -0.060 (-5.07) 396,572 -0.051 (-3.26) 392,999
Panel D: Estimation methods
US applicants only -0.072 (-4.18) 690,499 -0.121 (-4.94) 976,151
Panel E: Alternative thresholds for names
Ambiguous names -0.009 (-1.04) 130,094 -0.012 (-0.63) 281,342
Panel F: Additional controls and fixed effects
Inventor experience -0.060 (-5.93) 939,495 -0.050 (-2.20) 1,207,482
Team group characteristics -0.064 (-5.25) 814,321 -0.011 (-2.42) 1,003,694
Team experience -0.064 (-5.25) 814,321 -0.012 (-2.44) 1,003,694
Team fixed effects -0.053 (-4.38) 700,219 -0.038 (-3.13) 979,288
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TABLE 6
Effect of In-group Biases on Patenting Outcomes
This table regresses outcomes during the patent examination process on racial and gender mismatches
between examiner and first inventor in the application. Panel A and B report results with racial and
gender mismatches respectively. In columns (4), (5), and (6), the analysis is conducted for the sub-sample
of applications that resulted in successful patent grants. First round grant is an indicator variable equal
to one if an application resulted in a successful patent grant without receiving a non-final rejection, and
zero otherwise. Appealed is an indicator variable equal to one if the applicant successfully requested
a re-examination of the patent application and zero otherwise. Decision time refers to the number of
calendar days from the date of initial application to the final decision or abandonment date. ∆ number
of claims is the change in number of claims allowed in a patent (usually a reduction) during the process
of patent examination, expressed as a percentage of the initial number of claims. ∆ words in claims is
the change in number of words in the patent during the process of patent examination, expressed as a
percentage of the initial number of words in the claims. Patent scope is the number of words in the first
independent claim of a patent normalized by other patents within the same art unit, as measured by
Kuhn and Thompson (2018). Racial (gender) mismatch is an indicator variable equal to one if the race
(gender) of the first inventor on the application is not the same as that of the patent examiner, and zero
otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors that allow for double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Racial mismatch -0.005 -0.001 2.790 -0.080 0.104 -0.012
(-4.46) (-1.89) (2.46) (-2.16) (3.39) (-1.68)
Foreign priority -0.003 -0.005 -2.508 2.797 -0.062 -0.022
(-1.20) (-1.61) (-0.68) (2.34) (-0.11) (-1.80)
Foreign applicatin -0.004 -0.001 -0.995 2.980 1.121 -0.061
(-1.77) (-0.50) (-0.58) (2.25) (2.21) (-4.97)
Small entity 0.005 -0.053 -46.795 0.666 -0.585 -0.151
(1.91) (-12.67) (-18.28) (0.60) (-1.04) (-6.99)
Examiner experience -0.036 0.147 201.685 15.943 -0.015 -0.036
(-12.76) (11.12) (15.43) (10.05) (-0.06) (-2.37)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 912,355 1,045,371 912,351 396,634 396,644 251,358
R2 0.41 0.47 0.76 0.46 0.38 0.52
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender mismatch -0.003 -0.003 1.640 -0.610 0.308 -0.005
(-1.72) (-2.38) (1.65) (-1.85) (1.90) (-1.81)
Foreign priority 0.001 -0.007 -3.179 1.813 0.027 -0.018
(0.56) (-1.97) (-0.82) (2.43) (0.06) (-2.25)
Foreign application -0.003 -0.003 -3.132 3.154 1.256 -0.077
(-1.53) (-1.41) (-2.17) (2.50) (3.79) (-6.92)
Small entity 0.007 -0.053 -47.529 0.278 -0.469 -0.149
(2.82) (-14.50) (-20.03) (0.35) (-0.83) (-7.18)
Examiner experience -0.036 0.147 203.197 15.653 0.056 -0.030
(-12.91) (10.88) (15.24) (10.58) (0.24) (-2.21)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,174,256 1,345,697 1,174,246 508,382 508,398 321,956
R2 0.54 0.56 0.68 0.49 0.41 0.40
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TABLE 7
Racial Salience, Examiner Workloads, and In-group Biases
This table regresses patent grant decisions on racial mismatch as well as interactions with measures of
salience of race and examiner workload. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one
if the patent application resulted in a final grant decision and zero otherwise. Racial mismatch is an
indicator variable equal to one if the race of the first inventor on the application is not the same as that
of the patent examiner, and zero otherwise. The variable racial conflict is equal to one when the negative
media mentions of China are above median as compared to the sample period and zero otherwise. A
mention is classified as negative, when the term China appears with a negative term in the headlines of
news articles in the newspapers Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times and New York
Post with negative terms being obtained from the Harvard IV TagNeg dictionary. Segregation state is
an indicator variable equal to one if the examiner received her earliest education at a university based
in a state which enacted racial segregation laws, and zero otherwise. Examiner workload is an indicator
variable equal to one if number of applications due with the patent examiner is above the median of
her art unit in the given year, and zero otherwise. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1.
t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for double-clustering at the
art unit and application year level.
Interaction variable
Racial conflict Segregation state Examiner
workload
(1) (2) (3)
Racial mismatch × interaction variable -0.035 -0.020 0.011
(-4.91) (-3.75) (0.55)
Racial mismatch -0.038 -0.050 -0.050
(-3.85) (-3.51) (-3.86)
Interaction variable -0.990 -0.038 -0.023
(-0.24) (-4.91) (-3.05)
Foreign priority -0.036 -0.028 -0.018
(-8.20) (-5.57) (-3.65)
Foreign application -0.010 -0.025 -0.012
(-6.37) (-6.51) (-5.16)
Small entity -0.108 -0.145 -0.129
(-34.86) (-39.30) (-16.32)
Examiner experience 0.114 0.127 0.100
(24.55) (25.43) (25.11)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes No Yes
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes
N 939,495 859,324 911,862
R2 0.55 0.56 0.50
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TABLE 8
Examiner In-group Biases and Patent Quality
This table presents the effects of racial and gender mismatches between the examiner and the first-
ranked inventor on measures of patent quality. Panels A and B report the results for race and gender
mismatches respectively. Forward citations refer to the number of patents which have cited the given
patent in the five year period after it has been issued. Backward citations is defined as the number
of patents cited by the given patent, including self-citations. Generality is defined as one minus the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the forward citations to the given patent. Originality is defined as
one minus the HHI of backward citations by the given patent. In computing Generality and Originality,
the HHI is calculated over the four-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) technology classes.
Racial (gender) mismatch is an indicator variable equal to one if the race (gender) of the first inventor
on the application is not the same as that of the patent examiner, and zero otherwise. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow
for double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial mismatch 0.093 1.813 0.070 0.002
(2.58) (15.94) (2.78) (3.45)
Foreign application -0.304 0.328 -0.014 -0.001
(-6.39) (0.80) (-0.19) (-0.15)
Small entity -0.148 -1.093 0.111 -0.002
(-2.89) (-1.44) (0.95) (-0.14)
Examiner experience -0.207 -0.463 -0.022 0.012
(-3.58) (-1.40) (-0.29) (1.37)
Foreign priority -0.076 -0.921 -0.020 0.005
(-1.69) (-1.75) (-0.26) (0.43)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 639,155 939,495 639,155 939,495
R2 0.52 0.72 0.79 0.63
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender mismatch 0.048 0.036 0.019 0.002
(2.26) (6.17) (1.27) (4.37)
Foreign application -0.299 0.113 -0.018 0.003
(-7.25) (0.35) (-0.30) (0.49)
Small entity -0.118 -0.957 -0.053 -0.008
(-2.64) (-1.61) (-0.37) (-0.69)
Examiner experience -0.229 -0.410 0.011 0.010
(-4.87) (-1.37) (0.16) (1.22)
Foreign priority -0.047 -0.890 -0.007 0.005
(-1.21) (-2.26) (-0.10) (0.46)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 909,477 1,207,482 909,477 1,207,482
R2 0.51 0.70 0.78 0.62
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TABLE 9
Examiner In-Group Biases and Startup Outcomes
This table presents the effect of group mismatch between the examiner and first inventor on the appli-
cation, on outcomes related to startups. Panels A and B report results from mismatches by race and
gender respectively. In column (1), the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
first inventor forms a new startup firm in five years after the decision on her first patent application.
In columns (2) to (6), the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the startup raises
venture capital funding in years 1 to 5 after the decision on its first patent application. In column (7),
the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the startup goes public after the decision
on its first patent application. Racial (gender) mismatch is an indicator variable equal to one if the race
(gender) of the first inventor on the application is not the same as that of the patent examiner, and zero
otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors that that allow for double-clustering at the art unit and application year level.
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Racial mismatch -0.011 -0.008 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.020 -0.006
(-2.05) (-1.84) (-1.71) (-1.99) (-1.67) (-1.79) (-3.15)
Foreign priority 0.014 -0.106 -1.013 -1.002 -1.072 -0.732 1.178
(0.57) (-7.10) (-5.06) (-4.77) (-4.40) (-4.59) (6.65)
Foreign application 0.047 -0.103 -0.000 -0.002 -0.687 -0.290 0.798
(2.20) (-6.60) (-5.14) (-5.95) (-4.54) (-5.22) (3.50)
Small entity 0.178 -0.338 -0.005 -0.013 -0.269 -0.178 4.390
(4.85) (-14.78) (-3.10) (-4.23) (-5.20) (-3.77) (11.38)
Examiner experience 0.069 0.102 0.040 0.029 0.525 0.021 33.543
(2.13) (2.50) (13.26) (10.28) (4.75) (2.33) (16.65)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,331 38,331 38,331 38,331 38,331 38,331 38,331
R2 0.17 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.59 0.79
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender mismatch -0.33 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.017 -0.021 -0.005
(-4.50) (-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.67) (-1.60) (-1.12) (-2.46)
Foreign priority -0.060 -0.277 -0.009 -0.003 -1.149 -1.144 -0.281
(-1.01) (-3.08) (-1.64) (-0.68) (-4.42) (-5.00) (-0.17)
Foreign application -0.175 -0.050 -0.009 -0.002 -0.621 -0.279 -0.453
(-4.17) (-2.31) (-1.99) (-0.89) (-4.17) (-6.04) (-0.32)
Small entity 0.278 -0.420 -0.013 -0.006 -0.250 -0.061 2.940
(10.35) (-7.50) (-6.52) (-2.32) (-4.30) (-1.94) (3.84)
Examiner experience -0.591 0.152 0.002 0.036 1.096 0.110 21.351
(-8.60) (4.11) (0.38) (11.91) (15.95) (4.99) (7.19)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Examiner FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 40,542 40,542 40,542 40,542 40,542 40,542 40,542
R2 0.13 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.53 0.68
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Appendix 1.A Variable Descriptions
TABLE A.1
Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable name Description Source
Dependent variables
Patent grant An indicator variable equal to one if an application resulted in
a successful patent grant and zero otherwise.
PatEx
First round grant An indicator variable equal to one if an application resulted in
a successful patent grant without receiving a non-final rejection
and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Appealed An indicator variable equal to one if the applicant successfully
requested a re-examination of the patent application and zero
otherwise.
PatEx
∆ number of claims The change in number of claims allowed in a patent (usually a
reduction) during the process of patent examination, expressed





∆ words in claims The change in number of words in the patent during the process
of patent examination, expressed as a percentage of the initial





Patent scope The number of words in the first independent claim of a patent
normalized by other patents within the same art unit, as mea-





Racial mismatch An indicator variable equal to one if the examiner and first-
ranked inventor on the application do not belong to the same








Gender mismatch An indicator variable equal to one if the examiner and first-
ranked inventor on the application do not belong to the same











Variable name Description Source
Control variables
Decision time Number of calendar days from the initial application date to
the final decision made by the patent examiner.
PatEx
Foreign application An indicator variable equal to one if the application is made by
an inventor whose correspondence address is based in a country
other than the United States, and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Small entity An indicator variable equal to one if the applicant has been
classified as a small entity by the USPTO, and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Examiner experience The natural logarithm of the number of patent grant decisions
made by the examiner prior to the application under consider-
ation.
PatEx
Foreign priority An indicator variable equal to one if the patent has been pre-
viously issued in a foreign jurisdiction, and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Racial salience and examiner workload
Racial conflict An indicator variable equal to one when the negative media
mentions of China are above median as compared to the sam-
ple period and zero otherwise. A mention is classified as neg-
ative, when the term China appears with a negative term in
the headlines of news articles in the newspapers Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times and New York










Segregation state An indicator variable equal to one if the examiner received her
earliest education at a university based in a state which enacted
racial segregation laws, and zero otherwise.
PatEx,
LinkedIn
Examiner workload An indicator variable equal to one if number of applications due
with the patent examiner is above the median of her art unit
in the application year, and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Patent quality
Forward citations The number of patents which have cited the given patent in the
five year period after it has been issued.
PatentViews







Variable name Description Source
Generality One minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the for-
ward citations to the given patent, where the HHI is calculated
over the four-digit International Patent Classification (IPC)
classes.
PatentViews
Originality One minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of backward
citations by the given patent, where the HHI is calculated over
the four-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) classes.
PatentViews
Costs
Startup formation An indicator variable if the first inventor forms a new startup





Venture Capital Funding An indicator variable equal to one if the startup raises venture





IPO An indicator variable equal to one if the startup goes public













Appendix 1.B Matching Procedure
I assign inventors and examiners to their race using a dictionary-matching process. I rely on
two main race disambiguation datasets - the data on racial frequencies by last names in the
2000 and 2010 Census Surname Tables provided by the United States Census Bureau and the
corresponding data on first names from Tzioumis (2018).8
The Census Surname Table reports last name frequencies by racial category based on re-
sponses to the decennial Census. I use these frequencies to compute the conditional probability
that a given name belongs to a race. For example, the last name “Smith” appears in 2,442,977
observations in the 2010 Census data with 70.9% of respondents with this surname being Non-
Hispanic Whites, 23.11% being Non-Hispanic Blacks, and the rest belonging to other racial
categories. Accordingly, this last name is assigned 0.71 and 0.23 probabilities of belonging to
the “white” and “black” racial groups respectively. I match the data between 2001 and 2009
to the 2000 Census Surname Table and the names recorded thereafter to the 2010 Table.
Overall, the census contains six racial categories - Non-Hispanic Whites, Hispanics, Non-
Hispanic Black, Asian and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, American Indian and
Alaskan Native, and Two or More Races. Tzioumis (2018), while following similar methodologies
and using the same racial categories, reports first name frequencies based on mortgage loan
applications.
An inventor (examiner) is assigned to a race if the probability of both the first and the last
name belonging to that racial category is greater than 0.70. I also apply stricter benchmarks of
0.75 and 0.80, and do not observe any significant impact on the results presented throughout
this paper. A final concern might be that these two datasets mainly reflect names in the United
States. To resolve these concerns, I assign unmatched names to their race using NamePrism
API - a web-based algorithm.
Overall, this procedure assigns a race to 13,215 out of 16,127 examiners and 2,516,347 out
of 2,814,389 inventors with non-missing names. This amounts to a 81.94% and 89.41% match
for examiners and inventors respectively.
I identify the gender of the inventor and the examiner using state-level data on name fre-
quency from the Social Security Administration (SSA). I first match the inventor to the state in
which she resides, and the examiner to the state in which she received her earliest educational
degree. A name is assigned to a gender when the percentage of names in the state belonging
to that gender exceeds 70%. For individuals based outside the United States, I use the cross-
country data provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Lax Martínez
et al., 2016). Using this procedure, I match 87.88% (14,173 out of 16,127) of examiners and
92.58% (2,605,635 out of 2,814,389) of inventors to their gender.
8Detailed methodologies used to produce these datasets can be found in Comenetz (2016) and Tzioumis (2018)
respectively.
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Institutional investors dominate today’s financial markets. As of 2016, they hold more than
75% of the aggregate market value of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. By allocating capital
to firms and by monitoring firm management, they play a crucial role in the economy. Possi-
bly due to the sheer size of their assets under management, the academic literature has long
implicitly considered institutional investors to be unconstrained when it comes to the resources
and attention they can devote to studying and engaging with firms in their portfolios.
Recent research challenges this view. Kempf et al. (2016) argue that institutional investors
are constrained in their ability to monitor, and document that their lack of attention increases
agency problems at the neglected firms. These agency problems can take a variety of forms,
ranging from more value-destroying investment decisions and opportunistic executive compen-
sation (Kempf et al., 2016), to less effective board monitoring (Liu et al., 2017) and more
earnings management (Garel et al., 2018).
In this paper I argue that limited attention of institutional investors has important impli-
cations beyond investment and governance. I provide evidence consistent with the idea that
limited attention of institutional investors has first-order effects on the information provided
to investors in financial markets. I hypothesize that shifts in the demand for information by
institutions, which occur because institutions try to optimize on where they allocate their lim-
ited attention, induces predictable shifts in the supply of information by financial analysts.
As detailed below, the link between analyst effort and institutional attention could be direct,
such that analysts observe and respond to shifts in institutional attention, or indirect, such
that analyst behavior is a response to changed firm behavior due to limited monitoring by
institutional investors. In either case, if institutions with limited attention focus on a given set
of stocks, then analyst effort will also shift towards the same stocks. As a result, managers
of firms that are not in the spotlight face lower scrutiny from both institutional investors and
financial analysts at the same time, leading to attention-induced “information dry-ups.”
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Showing that institutional investor attention matters for financial analysts would have po-
tentially important implications for how we think about the increasingly central role of insti-
tutional investors in financial markets, as well as about information provision in the financial
analyst industry. Yet, establishing such a link empirically is inherently difficult. One of the
central challenges is that attention cannot be directly observed. I overcome this challenge by
using a new proxy for institutional investor attention, proposed by Kempf et al. (2016) (KMS),
which exploits extreme returns in unrelated parts of institutional investors’ portfolios and how
exposed investors are to these shocks. Institutional investors who are temporarily reducing the
attention they pay to a given firm are labeled “distracted.” An important advantage of this
measure is that the variation in attention originates from events in unrelated industries that
are plausibly exogenous to the firm itself. This paper is thus able to measure the response of
financial analysts to exogenous shifts in the demand for information by institutional investors.
From a conceptual standpoint, whether and how limited attention of institutions matters
for effort provision by financial analysts is an empirical matter. Three broad scenarios are
conceivable. First, shifts in institutional investor attention may not matter for the incentives of
financial analysts. This could be because analysts are impartial observers of the activities in the
firms they cover, and their rewards for being accurate are not very sensitive to the attention
of institutional investors. A second possibility is that institutional shareholder distraction
provides opportunities for financial analysts to add value, because KMS show that shareholder
distraction leads to reduced monitoring by institutions and, in turn, to an increased tendency
of managers to pursue private benefits. Thus, there might be an increase in analyst effort. The
findings in this paper provide evidence consistent with a third scenario. Because institutional
investors influence the prestigious All-Star analyst rankings (Hong et al., 2000), analyst bonuses
(Groysberg et al., 2011), and promotions (Cen et al., 2017), analysts may decrease effort when
institutional shareholders are distracted. As a result, analyst research may act as a complement
to monitoring by institutional shareholders.
Using the KMS distraction measure on a dataset with more than 11,000 unique firms over
the period 1990 to 2016, I find that forecast quality deteriorates after periods of high institu-
tional investor distraction. Average forecast error increases by 9% for a one-standard-deviation
increase in investor distraction. Consistent with the existing literature, which argues that less
competition is usually associated with greater positive bias due to the internal incentive struc-
ture of sell-side research departments (Hong et al., 2000; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010), I also
document a substantial increase in forecast bias following investor distraction. These results
hold both at the firm-quarter level, i.e., averaging across all analysts covering the firm, as well
as at the analyst-firm-quarter level, where I can control for analyst × firm fixed effects.
My identification strategy removes important sources of potential confounding variation.
First, by exploiting differences in the exposure of institutional shareholders to extreme returns
in unrelated industries, the measure of attention used in this paper is plausibly exogenous to
the performance of the firm itself. Second, industry × quarter fixed effects implicitly controls
for any variable that does not vary across firms within a given industry and quarter, such
as industry-wide investment opportunities, the state of the business cycle, etc. In addition,
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the results are also robust to including firm fixed effects. Hence, any firm-level time-invariant
unobservable factor that might influence the match between a firm and its investors cannot
impact my findings. Finally, because there are multiple forecasts by the same analyst at a given
point in time, I can address concerns about heterogeneity in analyst skill, or other analyst-level
attributes, via analyst × firm fixed effects. In other words, I can show that the forecasts of the
same analyst covering the same firm are less accurate and more optimistic when the institutional
shareholders of the firm are inattentive. This makes it possible to isolate the causal effect of
investor distraction on analyst forecast quality.
The results on forecast accuracy and bias are of key importance to address concern about
information provision in financial markets. They show that limited shareholder attention indeed
affects the quality of the information produced by financial analysts, and thus, in turn, the
information environment for individual firms. While this evidence is important, the forecast
error and bias results have little power to discriminate between various drivers that could induce
the observed link between institutional attention and forecast quality. Such drivers include
reduced analyst effort, increased opportunistic managerial behavior induced by the lack of
institutional monitoring (KMS), or changes in the information firms disclose when shareholders
are distracted (e.g., Basu et al. (2017), Abramova et al. (2017)). All of these factors could
potentially lead to lower-quality forecasts.
In order to investigate whether the decrease in forecast accuracy could be driven by reduced
analyst effort, I test the relationship between investor inattention and observable measures of
analyst effort. I find that analyst effort decreases after periods of investor inattention, both on
the extensive margin and on the intensive margin. On the intensive margin, investor distraction
reduces the number of forecasts issued per analyst, increases forecast delays, and reduces the
length of questions asked in conference calls. On the extensive margin, the number of analysts
covering the firm decreases by 3.8% for a one-standard-deviation increase in investor distraction.
This is consistent with analysts having weaker incentives to spend time covering a given firm
when its institutional shareholders are distracted.
These results cast doubt, for example, on any theory under which analysts are “fooled”
by managers into thinking the firm is better than it actually is, because analysts who do
not expect managers to be engaging in potentially hard-to-observe private benefit extraction.
Likewise, less informative disclosure provided by firms alone would predict lower accuracy,
but not necessarily less effort by analysts, unless analysts anticipate the higher marginal cost
of analyzing the information and reallocate their effort accordingly. Hence, these results on
analyst effort are consistent with analysts strategically allocating effort in response to changes
in shareholder attention. This impact could either be direct, because analysts have an incentive
to focus on the set of stocks their largest clients focus on, or indirect, because analysts know that
shareholder distraction elicits a managerial response which raises the marginal costs of providing
a high-quality forecast. In both cases, analysts trade off marginal benefits and marginal costs
of providing a forecast for a given firm, and then allocate their effort accordingly across the
stocks in their coverage portfolio.
I perform a variety of additional tests to support the interpretation that analysts reallocate
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effort across the stocks they cover in response to shareholder distraction. Most importantly, I
study how an analyst’s forecast accuracy in a given firm is affected by investor distraction in
other firms covered by the same analyst at the same point in time. If analysts strategically
reallocate their effort in response to institutional investor attention (either directly, or indi-
rectly), then distraction in other firms in an analyst’s portfolio should have a positive effect on
accuracy. I find evidence consistent with this prediction: analysts with more distracted share-
holders in the remainder of their portfolio are more accurate, and have less positive bias. This
result strongly suggests that analysts allocate their effort away from firms held by distracted
investors and towards firms held by investors who are paying attention, and that this shift in
attention has a significant effect on their forecast accuracy.
These results are potentially important for our understanding of the role of institutional
investors and sell-side research in shaping the information provided by financial markets. First,
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to causally identify the importance of
institutional investors for the quality of sell-side research. Specifically, these findings imply
that institutional investor attention provides a strong incentive for sell-side analysts to exert
effort and provide accurate forecasts. Second, this paper contributes to our understanding
of how analysts allocate their effort across firms in their portfolios, suggesting that a common
proxy for the quality of the firm’s information environment, the number of analysts following the
firm, may be improved (see also Harford et al. (2018)). Finally, because the lack of monitoring
by shareholders and directors coincides with a deterioration in the information environment
of the firm, these results can help explain the magnitude of the agency problems associated
with institutional investor distraction documented by prior studies. They imply an equilibrium
in which it is optimal for institutional investors to pay attention to other firms, for financial
analysts to shift effort towards the same firms, and for managers of neglected firms to shirk.
2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Shareholder Distraction Measure
To fix ideas, I begin by outlining the empirical predictions of this paper as well as detailing the
shareholder distraction measure.
My starting point is an extension of the standard principal-agent framework (Berle & Means,
1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to a model with three players: principals, agents, and financial
analysts. In the absence of shareholder monitoring and external financial analysis, CEOs have
an incentive to maximize private benefits, even if this reduces shareholder value. For example,
the manager might make privately beneficial investments, such as a diversifying acquisition,
or pay herself more. With shareholder monitoring or external financial analysis, the manager
trades off private benefits with the cost of being caught. In general, greater monitoring intensity
and more intensive financial analysis will induce CEOs to focus more on maximizing shareholder
value.
I focus on monitoring by institutional investors, given the large theoretical literature mo-
tivating why and under which circumstances institutions can be effective monitors. Following
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KMS, I assume that monitoring capacity is a scarce resource that can temporarily lead mon-
itors to supply less than the otherwise optimal monitoring capacity. One way to think about
the mechanism is to frame the monitor’s problem as optimally allocating attention subject to
a limited attention constraint, in the spirit of the rational inattention literature in economics
(e.g., Sims (2003), Kacperczyk et al. (2016)). If institutional shareholders shift attention away
from a firm, this loosens monitoring constraints and managers have greater leeway to maximize
private benefits. KMS find empirical support for this prediction.
The main novelty in this paper is to consider the role of external financial analysts. Whether
and how limited attention of institutions affects the effort provision by financial analysts depends
on the structure of analysts’ incentives. Three broad scenarios are conceivable. First, shifts in
institutional investor attention may not matter for financial analysts if they do not affect their
benefits from being accurate. A second possibility is that shareholder distraction provides an
opportunity for financial analysts to add value, because KMS show that shareholder distraction
leads to reduced monitoring by institutions and, in turn, to an increase tendency of managers to
pursue private benefits. Thus, there might be an increase in analyst effort. Third, shareholder
distraction may lead to a reduction in analyst effort. This could be because shareholders are
less likely to read sell-side research on firms where they are distracted, or place a lower weight
on analysts’ accuracy on stocks to which they have not been paying attention when assigning
All-Star status or when making hiring decisions.
Whether financial analysis acts as a substitute or complement to shareholder monitoring
has first-order implications for the possibility of the CEO to extract private benefits. If it acts
as a complement, then the possibility for CEOs to extract private benefits is limited, even when
shareholders are distracted. If, on the other hand, it acts as a substitute, then the quality
of analyst research will deteriorate simultaneously with shareholder monitoring, enabling the
CEO to maximize private benefits.
I conjecture there exists an equilibrium in which it is optimal for institutional shareholders
to pay attention to other firms, for financial analysts to shift effort towards the same firms, and
for managers of neglected firms to shirk. I label such an equilibrium as an “information dry-up.”
The empirical findings of this study are consistent with the existence of such an equilibrium.x
My main variable of interest is a firm-level proxy for how much the “representative” institu-
tional shareholder in a given firm f is distracted in a given period. I call this proxy distraction,
and denote it by D. D is defined as in KMS. I focus on the attention of the institutional
shareholders of the firm as opposed to the attention of the entire universe of institutional in-
vestors, because shareholders likely have a greater demand for sell-side equity research than
non-shareholders.
The intuition behind D is straightforward: a given investor i in firm f is more likely dis-
tracted if there is an attention–grabbing event in another industry, and if that other industry is
important in investor i’s portfolio. I first compute an investor-level distraction score, and then








wifq−1 × wINDiq−1 × ISINDq (2.1)
where Fq−1 denotes the set of firm f ’s institutional shareholders at the end of quarter q−1, IND
denotes a given Fama-French 12 industry, and INDf denotes firm f ’s Fama-French industry.
ISINDq captures whether a distracting event occurs in an industry other than INDf , and wINDiq−1
captures how much investor i cares about the other industry. The weight wifq−1 captures how
important investor i is for firm f .
KMS find that lower shareholder distraction is negatively correlated with conference call
participation, changes in institutional investor portfolio, and shareholder proposals. Overall,
the evidence suggests that ‘distraction’ plausibly measures institutional investor attention.
2.2.2 Data
I construct my main sample by merging several datasets. I begin by matching one- and two-
quarter-ahead earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S from 1990 to 2016 with quarterly earnings
announcements from the CRSP-Compustat merged database. As in prior literature, I only
retain forecasts issued after 1990 due to concerns about insufficient coverage in I/B/E/S in
preceding periods (Hong et al., 2000; Diether et al., 2002).
I apply standard filters from the literature to this merged dataset. First, I retain only
the most recent forecast issued for a firm by an analyst in the quarter. Second, to exclude
stale forecasts, I retain only forecasts issued or revised within 60 calendar days immediately
preceding the earnings announcement date. Finally, to eliminate outliers, I drop observations
where the unadjusted stock price is lower than $5 or where the adjusted earnings or forecast is
greater than the adjusted stock price.
I then merge this dataset with financial statement data from Compustat, with data on share
prices, returns, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads from CRSP, and with institutional holding
information from the Thomson Reuters 13f database. I exclude micro-caps, defined as stocks
with market value below the 20th NYSE percentile breakpoint following Fama & French (2008),
as they are not relevant for most institutional investors. The final sample consists of 359,979
firm-quarter observations and 11,073 unique firms. I also construct a more disaggregated version
of the dataset at the analyst-firm-quarter level with 1,698,886 observations, 8,158 unique firms,
and 14,815 analysts.
I study two aspects of analyst forecast quality, namely, forecast optimism and forecast
accuracy. I measure forecast bias as the difference between the mean earnings per share forecast
issued by the analysts covering the firm and its actual earnings in quarter t+1, scaled by the
share price of the firm at the end of the previous quarter, as in Hong & Kacperczyk (2010).
Forecast accuracy is defined as the absolute value of bias. Since institutional owners have been
shown to value accurate earnings forecasts (Ljungqvist et al., 2007), these two measures capture
a relevant dimension of the quality of the information available to the wider financial market.
I measure analyst effort both at the intensive and the extensive margin. For the intensive
margin, I consider three distinct measures of analyst effort, defined as in Merkley et al. (2017).
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First, I examine changes in the number of forecasts issued by the average analyst. This measure
is defined as the total number of forecasts issued for a given firm in quarter t+1, divided by the
number of analysts who issued at least one forecast for the firm in quarter t-1. Second, I measure
the ‘delay’ with which these forecasts are issued. I expect that analysts issue forecasts earlier
for firms to which they have allocated greater effort (Hong et al., 2000; Cooper et al., 2001).
Delay is defined as the number of days between the end of quarter t and the earliest forecast in
the subsequent quarter. Finally, I study the average length of the questions asked by analysts
in conference calls. This measure permits direct analysis of the observable aspect of the effort
exerted by analysts in interacting with managers of firms for which they are issuing forecasts.
Taken together, these three measures gauge the amount of effort that analysts dedicate to
covering the stocks in their portfolio.
I measure the extensive margin of analyst effort as the change in the number of active
analysts covering a firm in a given quarter. Changes in the number of active analysts are
defined as the difference between analyst entries and exits. Following Merkley et al. (2017),
analyst entries are defined as the total number of analysts who have either issued a forecast in
quarter t+1, after not having done so for the preceding four quarters, or who are issuing their
first forecast for the firm in the sample in t+1. Similarly, analyst exits are measured as the
number of analysts who issue a forecast in t but not in the next four quarters.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for my main sample. As noted previously, insti-
tutional owners are an economically important group of shareholders, holding 38% of firms’
shares on average. Additionally, of the shares held by institutional investors, 46% are held by
the five largest investors in the firm. The average mean forecast error and bias are 0.65% and
0.27%, respectively, in line with previous studies. About 11 analysts issue a forecast for a firm
in a given quarter, and a one-standard-deviation change in the number of analysts is equal to
one analyst per quarter.
2.2.3 Empirical Strategy
The following thought experiment illustrates my empirical approach. Consider two otherwise
identical firms 1 and 2 in a given industry and quarter. Firm 1’s representative shareholder
holds two stocks. The first is firm 1 itself, and the second is another firm belonging to a different
industry, which for the sake of this example I call “banks”. The representative shareholder of
firm 2 does not hold any bank stocks. Suppose now that there is an attention-grabbing event
in the banking industry; for example, a banking crisis that sends prices of bank stocks falling.
Assuming limited attention, the representative shareholder in firm 1 may, potentially rationally,
shift attention towards banks and away from firm 1. If sell-side analysts follow the attention of
institutional investors, then the amount of effort they allocate to researching firm 1 decreases,
and their forecast accuracy declines. In contrast, and by construction, firm 2 is not affected.
I can therefore identify the impact of variation in investor attention on analyst effort and
analyst forecast accuracy by analyzing changes in analysts’ effort and forecast accuracy on firm
1 relative to firm 2 following the exogenous shock. Following KMS, I use “extreme” industry
returns (both positive and negative) as the main empirical proxy for attention-grabbing events.
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I implement this idea by regressing changes in analyst coverage and analyst effort on lagged
institutional investor distraction:
yfj,t+1 = αj,t+1 + αf + βDistractionfjt + γ′Xfjt + ϵfj,t+1, (2.2)
where the dependent variable, yfj,t+1 refers to average analyst forecast accuracy or average
analyst effort, respectively, in firm f operating in industry j in quarter t+1. Distractionfjq is
the weighted average distraction of the institutional shareholders in firm f at time t, defined as
in KMS and measured as a moving average during quarter t and the previous three calendar
quarters. I relate changes in forecast quality and analyst effort to institutional shareholder
distraction in the previous four quarters for two main reasons. First, by using lagged instead
of contemporaneous changes in investor attention, I allow analysts to observe and react to
changes in investor attention with some lag. The underlying assumption is that preparing
earnings forecasts and talking to management may take time, and that the amount of time and
effort analysts spend on researching the firm in the current quarter likely affects the quality
of the forecasts made in the next quarter, even if investors are now less distracted. Second,
by measuring institutional investor distraction over longer horizons, I am capturing the effect
of prolonged periods of inattention, which are arguably more likely to induce a reaction in
analysts’ allocation of effort.1
The set of fixed effects included further mitigates concerns about potential confounding
factors. αj,t+1 are industry × quarter fixed effects, so that I compare firms within the same
industry at a given point in time, as in the motivating example above. This permits ruling
out the effect of any factors that do not vary within industry-date. In particular, it implicitly
controls for the possibility that some industries may be more related to the “shock” industry
that experiences extreme returns, e.g., due to supplier relationships. In addition, by including
firm fixed effects (αf ), I control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This ensures that
selection stories in which some unobservable, time-invariant, variable matches firms that receive
less analyst coverage with investors exposed to “shock” industries. Additional controls (Xfjt)
include the level of institutional ownership in t-1 and institutional ownership concentration
as in Hartzell & Starks (2003), so these results are not subsumed by standard measures of
institutional ownership structure. Following Hong & Kacperczyk (2010), I also control for the
log of the firm’s market capitalization, the quarterly stock return and stock return volatility in
quarter t, the book-to-market-ratio, volatility of ROE, and profit. I provide a complete list of
variable definitions in Appendix A.1.
1In the robustness tests, I also report results when distraction is measured over one quarter only. The results
are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
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2.3 Main Results
2.3.1 Shareholder Distraction and Analyst Forecast Quality
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, there might be larger analyst forecast errors when institutional
investors are distracted and sell-side research acts as a complement to shareholder monitoring.
In addition, if less analyst effort reduces competition, this might result in more optimistically
biased forecasts (see Hong & Kacperczyk (2010), Merkley et al. (2017)).
Table 2 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the mean forecast error,
measured as the absolute difference between the consensus mean forecast and the actual earnings
per share. Columns (3) and (4) report results for mean forecast bias as the dependent variable,
defined as the difference between the consensus mean forecast and the actual earnings per share.
Columns (1) and (3) include industry × quarter fixed effects, and columns (2) and (4) add firm
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions.
The results suggest that forecast accuracy deteriorates and forecast bias increases as in-
stitutional investor attention decreases. The coefficient on distraction in column (2) implies
that a one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction leads to an increase in the
average forecast error of 8.7% (=1.415 × 0.04/0.65). The effect on mean forecast bias, reported
in columns (3) and (4), is similarly sizable. The results are stronger once firm fixed effects are
included, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level is biasing against finding a
significant effect. Importantly, the inclusion of firm fixed effects allows ruling out the possibility
that the earnings of firms with distracted shareholders are always harder to forecast. Overall,
these findings suggest that institutional shareholder distraction reduces the quality of sell-side
analyst forecasts, consistent with the hypothesis that analysts’ incentives to produce accurate
forecasts are weaker when institutions are paying less attention.
I also ensure that these findings are robust to performing the analysis at the individual
analyst level, where forecast error and forecast bias can be computed for an individual analyst
covering a certain stock in a given quarter, thereby controlling for additional confounding
factors. This approach also makes it possible to disentangle whether the higher forecast error
is driven by changes in the composition of analysts or brokerage firms covering the firm, or by
changes in forecast accuracy within the same analyst or within the same brokerage house for
the same firm.
Table 3 reports the results. I estimate regression 2.2 at the analyst-firm-quarter level, and
sequentially add higher-dimensional fixed effects. Columns (1) and (4) add broker fixed effects,
columns (2) and (5) add analyst fixed effects, and columns (3) and (6) add analyst × firm
fixed effects. The specification with analyst × firm fixed effects is particularly informative,
because it implies that forecasts by the same analyst for the same firm are less accurate when
distraction is high. The point estimate of the coefficient on shareholders distraction is hardly
affected by including these additional fixed effects. This suggests that the increase in forecast
bias and forecast error is largely driven by within-brokerage firm and within-analyst changes
in accuracy for the same firm, as opposed to changes in the composition of analysts covering
the firm (e.g., more accurate analysts dropping coverage of the firm). It also substantially
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raises the bar for alternative explanations. The economic significance is even larger in this
more disaggregated sample: the estimates from the strictest specification (column (3)) imply a
14.8% (=1.829 × 0.05/0.62) increase in forecast error for a one-standard-deviation increase in
distraction.
I perform additional robustness tests for the results on forecast error in Table 4. First, the
results are effectively unchanged upon estimating with the median instead of the mean forecast
error (Panel A). In Panel B, I use distraction measured in quarter t as opposed to the moving
average measured over quarter t-3 to t. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very
similar, suggesting that even a relatively short period of investor distraction such as one quarter
can lead to a substantial decline in analyst forecast quality. Panel C changes the timing of the
control variables to t-1 instead of t, in order to address the possibility that these variables may
also be outcomes of investor distraction and, hence, create a problem of endogenous controls.
Next, I address the potential issue that, within a given Fama-French industry, some firms may be
mechanically related to the shock industry because they are misclassified, and may be harder
to forecast because they are directly affected by the new information released in the shock
industry. I define an industry relatedness variable as follows: I first obtain, for each firm, the
set of closely related firms from the Hoberg & Phillips (2010) text-based industry classification
dataset from Professor Gerard Hoberg’s website; I then compute, for each firm, the percentage
of related firms which operate in the shock industries to obtain a firm-specific proxy for the
severity of the misclassification problem. Because the Hoberg-Phillips data start only in 1996,
I use the first available firm-pair in all previous periods in which I observe both firms in the
data. The results in Panel C indicate that relatedness to the shock industries does not induce
my previous results. In Panel D, I address concerns that data on institutional investor holdings
from Thomson Reuters 13f after 2012 contains inaccuracies (Gilje et al., 2018), by dropping
observations after 2012. Despite this change in sample size, I find that the results are stronger,
both in terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude. Finally, in Panel E I estimate
the regressions at the annual rather than at the quarterly frequency. The magnitude of the
economic is, if anything, stronger than in the quarterly data, but statistical significance is lower.
Overall, the results presented so far strongly support a causal and robust effect of institu-
tional investor distraction on the quality of earnings forecasts.
2.3.2 Shareholder Distraction and Analyst Effort
My results on forecast accuracy and forecast bias show that limited shareholder attention
indeed affects the quality of the information produced in financial markets, and thus, in turn,
the information environment for individual firms. Yet, they have little power to discriminate
between various drivers that could induce the observed link between institutional attention
and forecast quality. These include reduced analyst effort, increased opportunistic managerial
behavior induced by the lack of institutional monitoring (KMS), or changes in the information
firms disclose when shareholders are distracted (e.g., Basu et al. (2017), Abramova et al. (2017)).
All of these factors could potentially lead to lower-quality forecasts.
In order to investigate whether part of the decrease in forecast accuracy could be driven
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by reduced analyst effort, I test whether institutional investor distraction is related to direct
measures of analyst effort. I consider three proxies for analyst effort proposed in the literature.
First, I study changes in the average number of forecasts issued per analyst, following Merkley
et al. (2017). Second, I look at the average delay of analysts’ forecasts, because Hong et al.
(2000) and Cooper et al. (2001) argue that longer delays reflect lower analyst effort. Delay is
computed as the number of days between the end of the previous quarter t and the earliest
forecast issued by the analyst in the current quarter t+1. Finally, I measure analyst effort
using the average length of the questions asked by analysts in conference calls (see Merkley
et al. (2017)).
The estimated results are presented in Table 5. All three proxies for analyst effort indicate
that analysts work less hard when institutional shareholders have been focusing their attention
elsewhere. Analysts issue 3.2% (= −0.453×0.04/0.57) fewer forecasts during a quarter following
investor distraction (columns (1) and (2)), their forecasts have a one-day (= 26.109 × 0.04)
greater delay (columns (3) and (4)), and they ask firm managers shorter questions in conference
calls (columns (5) and (6)). The latter effect is economically modest and amounts to ca. 0.4
(=9.205 × 0.04) fewer words per question.
An extreme form of reducing effort would be to stop coverage of a firm all together. It is
possible that brokerage firms which are on the margin of whether or not to cover a specific
stock, or how many analysts to assign, may be more likely to remove an analyst after a period
of prolonged investor inattention. To test for an effect of investor distraction on the extensive
margin of analyst effort, I consider changes in the number of analysts following the firm. Fol-
lowing Merkley et al. (2017), changes in analyst coverage are defined as the difference between
the number of analysts who do not issue any forecast for the firm in the next four quarters and
the number of analysts who start to issue a forecast, after not having done so for the past four
quarters. Hence, this measure of analyst coverage captures the effect of shareholder distraction
on persistent changes in analyst coverage. Since the number of analysts following is a central
component of a firm’s information environment and has been shown to affect firms’ financing
and investment policies (e.g., O’Brien & Bhushan (1990), Hong & Kacperczyk (2010), Derrien
& Kecskés (2013), Balakrishnan et al. (2014)), this is an important result.
Table 5, columns (7) and (8), reports the results. Periods of high investor distraction lead
to a persistent decrease in the number of analysts following the firm. The point estimate in
column (8) implies 0.04 (= −0.986 × 0.04) fewer analysts, on average, for a one-standard-
deviation increase in distraction. I find very similar results upon replacing changes in the
number of analysts following by changes in the number of brokerage houses covering the firm
(results unreported for brevity).
These results cast doubt on any theory under which analysts are deceived by managers into
thinking that the firm is better than it actually is, and remain in the dark about managers
engaging in potentially hard-to-observe private benefit extraction. The reason is that such
a theory would not predict that analysts scale back effort or drop coverage. Likewise, less
informative disclosure provided by firms alone would not lead to less effort, unless analysts
observe the change in disclosure and then reallocate their effort in response. Hence, the above
54
results support the view that sell-side analysts strategically re-optimize their effort in response
to changes in institutional investor attention. Importantly, they also imply that sell-side analyst
research and institutional shareholder monitoring act as complements rather than substitutes,
thereby leading to substantial time-variation in the quality of the information environment of
the firm.
2.3.3 Shareholder Distraction in Other Firms
So far the findings suggest that analysts reduce their effort in response to a decrease in insti-
tutional investors’ attention on the firms they cover. A remaining question is whether analysts
substitute the reduced effort on one stock for more leisure, or for additional effort on other
stocks they cover, where shareholders are paying more attention. In the latter scenario, institu-
tional investor distraction on other stocks that the analyst covers should lead to greater forecast
accuracy. Specifically, if analysts optimally reallocate their effort across their portfolio based
on institutional investor attention, then one would expect analysts with more distracted stocks
in the rest of their portfolio to exert greater effort and exhibit greater accuracy, compared to
other analysts with less distracted firms in the rest of their portfolio.
In order to test this prediction, I compute a variable Other distraction, which is defined
as the value-weighted average shareholder distraction computed over all other firms covered
by the analyst, excluding the firm itself. I then repeat the analysis in Table 3, while adding
Other distraction to the regression equation. Table 6 presents the results. As predicted by
my hypothesis, higher shareholder distraction on other firms in the analyst’s portfolio increase
her accuracy compared to other analysts with less shareholder distraction in the rest of their
portfolio. Analyst forecasts for a firm become 2.4% (= −0.291 × 0.05/0.62) more accurate and
5.6% (= −0.303 × 0.05/0.27) less optimistic when shareholder distraction for other firms in
their portfolios increases by one standard deviation.
In sum, analysts appear to strategically reallocate effort across the stocks in their portfolio,
in line with institutional shareholder attention. This leads to substantial time-variation in the
quality of the information environment of the firm.
2.4 Conclusion
I study the effect of institutional investor attention on the quality of sell-side analyst research.
Using firm-level institutional shareholder “distraction” measures, I show that analyst forecast
quality deteriorates when institutional shareholders focus their attention on unrelated indus-
tries. This loss in forecast accuracy coincides with a reduction in observable measures of analyst
effort, such as the number of forecasts issued per analyst, average forecast delay, and the average
length of questions asked by analysts in conference calls. Overall, these patterns are consistent
with a model in which analyst coverage follows the attention of institutional investors, leading
to periods of “information dry-up.” In these periods, managers can get away with shirking, be-
cause the lack of monitoring by shareholders coincides with a deterioration in the information
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environment of the firm. My results can therefore help explain the magnitude of the agency




The table presents summary statistics for key variables. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for
the aggregate sample, which contains firm-quarter observations from 1990 to 2016. Panel B presents
the statistics for the disaggregated sample with analyst-firm-quarter observations. A complete list of
variable definitions is provided in Appendix A.1.




Dependent variables: Forecast quality
Mean forecast errort+1 199,971 0.65 1.15 0.07 0.21 0.61
Median forecast errort+1 199,971 0.65 1.15 0.06 0.20 0.61
Mean forecast biast+1 199,971 0.27 1.02 -0.13 0.01 0.33
Median forecast biast+1 199,971 0.27 1.02 -0.13 0.00 0.32
Dependent variables: Analyst coverage and effort
Forecasts per analystst+1 200,294 0.57 0.52 0.23 0.38 0.67
Delayt+1 223,781 71.68 29.00 50.31 68.70 88.38
Question lengtht+1 68,880 34.23 9.39 27.59 33.86 40.26
Number of analystst+1 210,297 10.89 6.65 5.00 9.00 15.00
∆ Analystst+1 210,297 0.01 1.04 -1.00 0.00 1.00
Dependent variables: Information quality
Abnormal volumet+1 354,216 -0.282 1.034 -0.771 -0.221 0.272
Abnormal volatilityt+1 382,024 -0.181 1.727 -1.099 0.011 0.955
Bid-Ask Spreadt+1 319,747 0.110 0.550 -0.379 0.068 0.197
Amihudt+1 378,881 0.367 1.182 -0.984 0.345 0.466
Key independent variables
Distraction 352,600 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.18
Control variables
IOt−1 329,087 0.38 0.29 0.08 0.37 0.62
Top 5 IO sharet−1 335,021 0.46 0.26 0.32 0.44 0.62
Log of market capt 352,055 6.72 1.37 5.75 6.74 7.80
Stock price returnt 352,537 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.05
Return volatilityt 352,512 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.12
Log of B/M ratiot 213,742 -0.81 0.70 -1.28 -0.77 -0.33
Volatility of ROEt 213,837 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03
Profitt 215,722 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04
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Dependent variables: Forecast quality
Forecast errort+1 1,221,586 0.62 1.04 0.06 0.20 0.61
Forecast biast+1 1,221,586 0.27 0.94 -0.13 0.00 0.33
Key independent variables
Distraction 1,665,404 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.18
Other distraction 1,665,298 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.16
Control variables
IOt−1 1,194,077 0.49 0.32 0.21 0.57 0.74
Top 5 IO sharet−1 1,226,394 0.32 0.2 0.24 0.34 0.43
Log of market capt 1,665,298 8.03 1.47 6.94 7.95 9.12
Stock price returnt 1,665,375 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.05
Return volatilityt 1,665,365 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.12
Log of B/M ratiot 1,627,742 -0.91 0.7 -1.37 -0.87 -0.41
Volatility of ROEt 1,628,935 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03
Profitt 1,641,519 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04
Hight 1,665,365 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lowt 1,665,365 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
General experiencet 1,665,365 24.22 16.97 10.00 20.00 35.00
Firm-specific experiencet 1,665,365 10.29 9.04 3.00 7.00 15.00
Forecast aget 1,665,365 52.57 24.94 32.00 59.00 73.00
Portfolio sizet 1,665,365 12.97 6.39 8.00 12.00 17.00
SIC2t 1,665,365 3.19 1.99 2.00 3.00 4.00
Brokerage resourcest 1,665,365 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE 2
Shareholder Distraction and Average Forecast Quality
This table regresses average next-period analyst forecast quality on institutional investor distraction. In
specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable is mean forecast error, which is the absolute value of the
mean forecast bias, defined as the difference between the consensus (mean) forecast issued by analysts
and the actual earnings per share announced in quarter t+1, scaled by the share price at the end of
quarter t. In specifications (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the mean forecast bias. Forecast bias
and error are defined as in Hong & Kacperczyk (2010). Institutional investor distraction is defined over
quarters t-3 to t, as in Kempf et al. (2016). Control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics,
reported in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the firm level.
Mean forecast errort+1 Mean forecast biast+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distraction 0.802 1.415 0.847 1.406
(2.16) (4.20) (2.44) (4.25)
IOt−1 0.045 0.027 0.066 0.044
(2.08) (1.23) (3.70) (2.10)
Top 5 IO sharet−1 -0.014 -0.093 -0.163 -0.124
(-0.45) (-2.92) (-5.81) (-4.11)
Log of market capt -0.017 -0.132 -0.003 0.037
(-2.84) (-12.81) (-0.49) (3.99)
Stock price returnt -1.110 -0.605 -1.401 -0.868
(-19.45) (-11.09) (-25.41) (-16.17)
Return volatilityt 1.186 0.613 0.682 0.338
(19.06) (11.70) (12.07) (6.66)
Log of B/M ratiot 0.476 0.499 0.235 0.367
(46.15) (43.33) (27.94) (32.75)
Volatility of ROEt 9.770 8.776 5.486 5.295
(55.85) (62.52) (42.42) (41.90)
Profitt -3.575 -3.475 -3.050 -3.545
(-17.22) (-15.00) (-14.83) (-14.69)
Industry× quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
N 182,150 181,836 182,150 181,836
R2 0.29 0.40 0.15 0.27
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TABLE 3
Shareholder Distraction and Forecast Quality – Analyst-Level
This table regresses next-period analyst forecast quality (at the analyst-firm level) on institutional in-
vestor distraction. In specifications (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the analyst forecast error, which
is the absolute value of the forecast bias, defined as the difference between the forecast issued by the an-
alyst and the actual earnings per share announced in quarter t+1, scaled by the share price at the end of
quarter t. In specifications (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the analyst forecast bias. Forecast error
and bias are defined as in defined as in Hong & Kacperczyk (2010). Institutional investor distraction is
defined over quarters from t-3 to t, as in Kempf et al. (2016). Control variables are defined in Appendix
A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the firm level.
Forecast errort+1 Forecast biast+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 1.896 1.894 1.829 1.701 1.679 1.352
(4.50) (4.64) (4.34) (4.23) (4.31) (3.29)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brokerage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE No Yes No No Yes No
Analyst×firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
N 908,748 907,842 871,860 908,748 907,842 871,860




This table presents robustness checks. The baseline regression refers to columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.
For brevity I only report coefficients of interest and suppress the control variables. In Panel A, median
forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between the consensus (median) forecast issued by
analysts and the actual earnings per share in quarter t+1, scaled by the share price at the end of quarter
t. In Panel B, I measure distraction over one quarter only (quarter t), following Kempf et al. (2016).
In Panel C, I estimate the baseline regression with additional controls. Lagged controls refers to a
specification in which all controls are measured in quarter t-1. Industry relatedness is defined as the %
of firms which operate in the shock industries out of the total sample of closely related firms, where the
latter is defined as in Hoberg & Phillips (2010). In Panel D, I estimate the results using data before and
including the year 2012, to alleviate concerns arising from inaccuracies in Thomson Reuters 13f after










Baseline 0.802 2.16 0.049 1.415 4.20 0.087 181,836
Panel A: Alternative measures of forecast quality
Median forecast error 0.772 2.07 0.047 0.901 4.06 0.055 156,037
Panel B: Alternative measures of distraction
One-quarter distraction 0.782 3.12 0.084 0.953 4.32 0.103 156,037
Panel C: Additional controls
Lagged controls 0.968 2.42 0.060 1.504 4.07 0.092 175,850
Industry relatedness 1.337 2.83 0.082 1.276 2.81 0.079 122,213
Panel D: Sample size
Sample truncated at 2012 1.736 4.38 0.109 1.610 4.28 0.101 149,182
Panel E: Estimation method
Annual frequency 2.023 1.95 0.133 1.534 1.70 0.101 40,292
61
TABLE 5
Shareholder Distraction and Average Analyst Effort
This table regresses analyst effort on institutional investor distraction. In specifications (1) and (2),
the dependent variable is the number of forecasts issued by active analysts in quarter t+1 per analysts
issuing forecasts in t-1. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the average number of days
between the end of the quarter t in which distraction event occurs and the first forecast issued by an
analyst in the subsequent quarter t + 1. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the average
length of questions asked by analysts in conference calls in the three quarters after distraction. Length
is measured as the ratio of words spoken by analysts to the number of questions asked during the call,
following Merkley et al. (2017). In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is defined as the change
in number of analysts from quarter t to t+1. Institutional investor distraction is defined over quarters
t-3 to t as in Kempf et al. (2016). Control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported
in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level.
Forecasts per
analystst+1
Delayt+1 Question lengtht+1 ∆ Analystst+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distraction -1.600 -0.453 50.719 26.109 -23.174 -9.205 -0.865 -0.986
(-6.00) (-2.11) (4.68) (2.41) (-3.59) (-1.92) (-3.29) (-3.17)
IOt−1 -0.283 -0.207 -4.270 -0.750 0.712 -0.064 -0.026 -0.084
(-16.00) (-11.97) (-5.70) (-0.84) (1.99) (-0.21) (-2.23) (-4.40)
Top 5 IO sharet−1 0.456 0.332 3.068 1.033 -0.619 0.075 0.115 0.187
(17.92) (14.37) (2.69) (0.86) (-1.04) (0.15) (5.88) (6.87)
Log of market capt -0.167 -0.126 0.652 0.398 2.248 0.606 0.029 0.062
(-44.12) (-23.94) (3.95) (1.31) (16.33) (3.11) (10.72) (8.49)
Stock price returnt 0.444 0.259 3.815 0.799 -6.839 -2.856 0.695 0.326
(16.72) (11.49) (2.46) (0.51) (-8.85) (-4.39) (14.27) (6.36)
Return volatilityt -0.310 -0.023 5.559 4.349 6.062 0.663 0.186 0.081
(-10.14) (-1.09) (3.55) (3.06) (5.82) (1.03) (4.30) (1.67
Log of B/M ratiot -0.003 -0.047 2.280 0.195 -0.227 0.100 -0.111 -0.188
(-0.42) (-8.23) (9.12) (0.59) (-1.31) (0.50) (-23.86) (-21.13)
Volatility of ROEt -0.128 -0.025 22.305 13.166 7.771 0.593 -0.849 -0.795
(-2.16) (-0.57) (8.05) (5.00) (4.31) (0.41) (-12.93) (-9.21)
Profitt 0.942 0.484 26.147 4.710 -9.385 -4.518 0.842 1.582
(8.66) (5.17) (5.39) (0.83) (-2.62) (-1.62) (7.12) (8.86)
Industry×quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 147,199 146,836 146,274 145,896 60,143 60,053 182,459 182,139
R2 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.31 0.32 0.59 0.09 0.13
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TABLE 6
Shareholder Distraction in Other Firms and Forecast Quality
This table regresses next-period analyst forecast quality (measured at the analyst-firm level) on institu-
tional investor distraction in the firm, as well investor distraction in other firms in the analyst’s portfolio.
In specifications (1) to (3), the dependent variable is analyst forecast error, which is the absolute value of
forecast bias, defined as the difference between the forecast issued by an analyst and the actual earnings
per share in quarter t+1, scaled by the share price at the end of quarter t. In specifications (4) to
(6), the dependent variable is analyst forecast bias. Forecast error and bias are defined as in (Hong &
Kacperczyk, 2010). Institutional investor distraction is defined over quarters from t-3 to t, as in Kempf
et al. (2016). Other distraction is defined as the value-weighted average of the distraction measure for
all other firms in the analyst’s portfolio in the same quarter, excluding the firm itself. Control variables
are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are robust to clustering at the firm
level.
Forecast errort+1 Forecast biast+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distraction 1.901 1.893 1.834 1.705 1.678 1.357
(4.51) (4.64) (4.24) (4.22) (4.31) (3.31)
Other distraction -0.359 -0.427 -0.291 -0.244 -0.302 -0.303
(-4.84) (-4.94) (-3.01) (-3.49) (-3.74) (-3.37)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Brokerage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE No Yes No No Yes No
Analyst × firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
N 908,748 907,842 871,860 908,748 907,842 871,860
R2 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.28 0.29 0.37
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TABLE A.1
Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.




The absolute value of the difference between the consensus,
i.e., the mean (median) forecast issued by analysts, and the
actual earnings per share announced by the firm in quarter t+1,
scaled by the share price at the end of quarter t, as in Hong
& Kacperczyk (2010). I only retain forecasts issued or revised





The difference between the consensus, i.e., the mean (median)
forecast issued by analysts and the actual earnings per share
announced by the firm in quarter t+1, scaled by the share price
at the end of quarter t, as in Hong & Kacperczyk (2010). I
only retain forecasts issued or revised within 60 calendar days
immediately preceding the earnings announcement date.
I/B/E/S
Delayt+1 The number of days between the end of quarter t and the first
forecast issued by analysts for a firm in quarter t+1, averaged
across across all analysts covering the firm in t+1, following
Merkley et al. (2017).
I/B/E/S
Question lengtht+1 The average length of questions asked by analysts in conference
calls with managers in the three quarters after distraction, i.e.,
t+1, t+2, t+3. Length is measured as the ratio of words spoken
by analysts to the number of questions asked during the call,
following Merkley et al. (2017)
FactSet
Forecasts per analystst+1 The ratio of the total number of forecasts issued by analysts
for a firm in quarter t+1 to the number of analysts issuing at
least one forecast in t-1, as defined by Merkley et al. (2017).
I/B/E/S
∆ Analystst+1 The difference between number of analysts entering and exiting
in the quarter t+1, as per Merkley et al. (2017). Analyst exits
are all analysts who issue a forecast in quarter t, but do not
issue one for the next four quarters, or analysts who issue their
last forecast for the firm in quarter t. Analyst entries are all
analysts who issues a forecast in quarter t+1 after not having
issued one in the preceding four quarters, or analysts who issue






Variable name Description Source
Key independent variables
Distraction The average of institutional investor distraction for a firm over
quarters t to t-3, as defined in Kempf et al. (2016).
Other distraction The value-weighted average of institutional investor distraction
for all firms in analyst’s portfolio other than the given firm over




The fraction of the firm’s stock owned by institutional investors





Top 5 institutional owners’
(IO) sharet−1
The fraction of the firm’s stock owned by the five largest institu-
tional investors as defined in the Thomson Reuters 13f database






The natural logarithm of the firm’s stock price multiplied by
the number of shares outstanding at the end of quarter t.
CRSP
Stock price returnt The average return on the share of firm in quarter t. CRSP
Return volatilityt The standard deviation of the daily returns on the share of firm
in quarter t.
CRSP
Log of book to market
ratiot
The natural logarithm of the firm’s book value divided by its
market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) at the




Volatility of ROEt The variance of the residuals from an AR(1) model for a firm’s
return on equity using a 10-quarter series, following Hong &
Kacperczyk (2010).
Compustat
Profitt The ratio of operating income at end of quarter t to the book






Variable name Description Source
Control variables: Analyst-level
Hight Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in the top quartile
of market capitalization within the firms covered by the analyst




Lowt Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in the bottom quar-
tile of market capitalization within the firms covered by the




General experiencet Number of quarters for which the analyst has been active i.e.
issued at least one forecast, till quarter t.
I/B/E/S
Firm-specific experiencet Number of quarters for which the analyst has been active i.e.
issued at least one forecast for the firm, till quarter t.
I/B/E/S
Forecast aget The number of days between the date on which forecast was
issued and the end of the quarter t in which the forecast was
issued.
I/B/E/S
Portfolio sizet Number of firms for which the analyst issues at least one fore-
cast in quarter t.
I/B/E/S
SIC2t Number of unique SIC2 industries of firms for which the analyst
issues at least one forecast in quarter t.
I/B/E/S
Brokerage resourcest Dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is working at a





Gender Gap in Punishing Failure:
Evidence from U.S. Patent
Applications
3.1 Introduction
Do firms punish men and women for creative failures equally? The answer to this question
has important implications for participation and performance of women in the labor market.
If women are punished for failures resulting from experimentation at higher rates than equally
performing men, they may be discouraged from entry into creative fields or might be incentivized
to take lower risk. This, in turn, might lead to a gender gap in career outcomes even when
the performance of both men and women is the same. Still, scant evidence exists on how firms
respond to creative failures of their employees and how this response varies by gender.
One field where creative tasks are crucial to performance, and failure is common is innova-
tion. From the perspective of inventors, experimentation is crucial to the process of innovation.
Yet, outcomes of this process are uncertain and often, characterized by a high degree of failure
(Holström, 1989). Firms, on the other hand, are incentivized to design contracts with high
tolerance for failure in the short run, but which reward long-run success (Manso, 2011). Thus,
while failure is unavoidable for an inventor, low tolerance thereof is sub-optimal for the firm
(Tian & Wang, 2014).
To test for a gender gap in punishment in innovation, I examine an important and salient
portion of the innovation process: a patent application. 1 Specifically, I analyze how failure to
obtain a patent affects the careers of male and female inventors who are applying for patents
for the first time. However, such an analysis is fraught with empirical challenges. First, it
necessitates data which track the career outcomes of individuals over time and between firms.
Second, it requires a measure of failure that can be used to compare different inventors em-
ployed at different firms. Third, failure in an application might be endogenously determined
1Patents add considerable market value to firms (Hall et al., 2005; Kogan et al., 2017). At the same time, an
average patent application involves considerable uncertainty and a non-trivial probability of failure.
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by unobserved characteristics, such as quality, of the underlying patent.
To address the first challenge, I compile a detailed dataset that links inventors who apply
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to their applications and also
to the firms who employ them. My sample consists of 985,437 unique inventors who made
their first applications between November 2001 and February 2013 and permits me to observe
their movements across 34,698 firms, including 33,000 startups. I solve the second challenge
by exploiting the systematic nature of the patenting process which implies that examiners are
restricted to a certain set of decisions on applications which can then be compared across
applicants. In particular, I focus on the inventors’ first application to the Patent Office as the
benchmark to compare different inventors. First-time patent applications have been shown to
have important implications for the long-term growth of startups and are therefore particularly
salient (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020). Finally, I use the differences in propensity between examiners
to grant a patent or “leniency” to tackle the issue of endogenous failure. This approach relies
on two features of the Patent Office: that the assignment of an application to an examiner is
quasi-random; and that there is considerable variation in how examiners interpret set rules and
thereby, decide to issue a patent or not (Lemley & Sampat, 2012; Farre-Mensa et al., 2020).
Thus, implementing this approach permits me to causally identify how firms treat failure.
I document an economically sizable and persistent gender gap in punishment of failure.
Specifically, firms are 9 p.p. more likely to fire female inventors for “as-good-as-random” patent
rejections in comparison to their male counterparts. This corresponds to a 64% (=9/14%)
higher probability of dismissal from employment in comparison to the average inventor. This
effect is significant up to 5 years after the initial decision from the patent office. Female inventors
who fail are less likely to be re-hired by other firms and are significantly more likely to exit
innovation altogether. Upon examining the behavior of other employees within the firm, I find
that women who face rejection in their first patent also obtain fewer coauthors. Overall, these
results suggest that firms treat creative failure by men and women differently.
I further conduct two subsample analyses to rule out the possibility that reduction in in-
ventor effort rather than punishment by the firm might drive these results. First, I compare
startups where female-led teams fail with those where they succeed, and find that the former
set of firms punish female prospective hires and even female employees who were not on the
patenting team. This reflects a firm-level change in behavior towards female employees. Sec-
ond, I find that independent female inventors neither face penalty in terms of labor market
outcomes nor in collaborative activity with coauthors.
Finally, I attempt to quantify the cost of this gender gap in penalty and find that female
inventors who suffer failure in initial patent applications lower both the quantity and quality of
their innovative output. In particular, women who face rejections file 17% fewer applications
and obtain 54% fewer patents compared to the unconditional mean.
Overall, my results show that even when faced with random failure, women get punished
by their employers to a greater extent than men. Thereby, my results relate to several litera-
tures. First, I contribute to the extensive literature which looks at gender gaps in labor market
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outcomes. 2 Traditionally, this literature has focused on higher rewards for men in terms of
hiring, promotion and wages (Neumark et al., 1996; Goldin & Rouse, 2000; Carlsson, 2011;
Goldin, 2014; Blau & Kahn, 2017). More recently, however, a small yet growing literature
has studied how punishment also varies across men and women. Egan et al. (2017) document
that women who engage in misconduct are much more likely to lose their jobs, but also less
likely to be re-hired by other firms. Sarsons (2017) documents that female doctors face a much
sharper drop in patient referrals relative to their male colleagues following a patient death. My
paper contributes to this literature by studying how failures which are customary to the job
result in much worse outcomes for women. Additionally, I am able to capture the effect of this
punishment gap on further productivity.
I also contribute to the literature highlighting gender gap in participation in scientific fields
and innovation. While prior studies have proposed biological (Hedges & Nowell, 1995), socio-
cultural,(Hyde & Mertz, 2009) and environmental factors (Carrell et al., 2010; Miyake et al.,
2010) as explanations for this gap, a big portion of this disparity still remains unexplained.
I propose and provide evidence for a new explanation: that women are penalized much more
than men for failures in producing creative output. My baseline results on dismissal from firms
and exit from innovation directly connect to the under-participation of women in innovation.
Finally, I provide novel evidence that employers punish all members of a minority group
for the failure of one individual in form of job dismissals as well as reduced hiring from that
particular group. In doing so, this paper contributes to prior work which shows evidence for
‘group’ punishment for minorities in classroom (Okonofua & Eberhardt, 2015) as well as in
updating beliefs about a group based on the outcome of one individual (Reuben et al., 2014;
Sarsons, 2017).
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the institutional back-
ground and presents the sample construction. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical strategy im-
plemented in this study. Section 3.4 documents the gender gap in punishment, considers alter-
native explanations, and quantifies the effect of this gap on productivity of inventors. Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
3.2.1 Examination Process
The patent prosecution process begins when a new application is submitted by an inventor or
a team of inventors to the USPTO. The Patent Office then sorts the application to the relevant
“art unit”, with each unit being a department of the Office specializing in a technological class.
Both art units and examiners are highly specialized. Between November 2001 and February
2018, there were more than 13000 examiners employed at the Patent Office in approximately
1000 art units.
Once the application is forwarded to an art unit, the Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE)
then assigns the patent applications to examiners in the unit. The patent is typically assigned
2For literature surveys of this topic, please see Altonji & Blank (1999), Marianne (2011), Blau & Kahn (2017).
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based on the number of cases pending with the examiner, the application number or on the
filing date of the application (Shu et al., 2019). Furthermore, both interviews as well as prior
studies indicate that within each art unit, the assignment to examiners is random and unrelated
to applicant or firm characteristics (Lemley & Sampat, 2012; Farre-Mensa et al., 2020). While
inventors and firms can tailor their applications such that it is likely to be sent to a given unit,
they cannot affect the choice of the specific patent examiner who will review their application.
Each patent application consists of claims to novelty and the role of the examiner is to assess
whether the claims should be allowed. To do so, the examiner conducts a thorough review of
prior “art” or literature. After conducting the review, the examiner sends a “first-action letter”,
which is the first communication between the applicant and the examiner. Typically, a non-
final rejection is issued with objections to the claims made by the applicant. The applicants
can change their patent claims and respond to this initial decision.
Examiners, then, decide whether to approve these amended claims or to issue a final rejec-
tion. Applicants have an option to appeal a final rejection or file a continuation or divisional
application. On average, the patent prosecution process takes about 3.4 years.
3.2.2 Data
I compile a comprehensive dataset which links firms to the individual inventors employed by
them and to the applications filed by these inventors. The core of my data comprises of the
Patent Examination (PatEx) dataset consisting of information on all patent applications filed
with the USPTO between January 1981 and February 2018 (Graham et al., 2018b). This
database contains uniquely identified examiners, their decisions on applications, the names
of applicant inventors, and the name of the assignee, that is the individual or firm to whom
the patent ownership is transferred. I only retain first-time utility applications filed between
November 2001 and February 2013, as the coverage for data on rejected applications prior to
this period is incomplete (Graham et al., 2018b; Tabakovic & Wollmann, 2018). I truncate the
data at February 2013 so as to observe at least five years of effects of failure in patenting.
A central identifying assumption of this paper is the random assignment of applications
within art units and so, I exclude cases where assignment is not random i.e. continuations,
divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Additionally, applications where examiners do not issue
a decision such as provisional, reissue, and patent co-operation treaty (PCT) applications are
dropped.
In order to assemble the final dataset using PatEx, I need to overcome three central chal-
lenges: (1) uniquely identifying individual inventors, (2) identifying gender of these inventors,
and (3) linking inventors to the firms where they are employed.
I begin by using an algorithm designed by Li et al. (2014) to distinguish between individuals
with similar names. This algorithm uses a vector of different characteristics recursively to
determine whether a given patent is likely to have been written by the inventor. This, in turn,
allows me to uniquely and accurately identify inventors and their coauthors.
The next challenge is identifying the gender of the disambiguated inventors. I use state-
level name frequency data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) to match inventors
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to their gender using their first name. A name is matched with a gender when the percentage
of names in that state belonging to that gender is above 95%. Where the name cannot be
matched to a gender using this dictionary or for inventors residing outside the United States, I
use the cross-country dataset on frequency of names provided by the WIPO (World Intellectual
Property Organization) (Lax Martínez et al., 2016). Overall, I match about 86% of all inventors
(2,435,291 out of 2,814,389) from the original PatEx dataset.
The third challenge is matching inventors to firms, as these are not readily given in the
PatEx dataset. I use the data provided by Arora et al. (2019) which link granted patents to
the firms in the CRSP-Compustat. To link applications to firms, I use the Patent Assignee
file in the PatEx database and use the code provided by the NBER patent data project which
cleans and matches assignee names to firm names in the CRSP-Compustat dataset based on
the degree to which the two names share unusual words.3
To identify startup firms, I implement the approach described by Farre-Mensa et al. (2020)
and use firm names from Thomson One VentureXpert database. Next, I drop firms based
outside the United States, not-for-profit entities like academic institutions or government agen-
cies, and large publicly listed firms which are listed in the CRSP-Compustat dataset. I drop
applicants which are not classified as “small business entity” in the PatEx dataset and thereby,
construct the final sample.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for my main sample. The final sample consists
of 985,437 first-time patent applicant inventors with 34,698 unique firms of which 33,098 are
startups. The average final rejection rate for a patent is 36% , while approximately, 16% of all
first-time inventors are female.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The key empirical challenge of this paper is disentangling the outcome i.e. “rejection” of the
application, from the quality and other unobserved characteristics of the patent which might
influence the examiner’s final decision. I tackle this challenge twofold: first, I exploit the
quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to applicants within each art unit, and second,
I use the instrumental variables (IV) approach proposed by Farre-Mensa et al. (2020), wherein
the instrument measures the “leniency” or the propensity of the examiner to grant a patent.
Leniency is defined as the number of applications granted by a given examiner divided by the
number of patents reviewed by her, prior to filing date of the focal patent. As this analysis
focuses on outcomes after rejection, I subtract leniency from one constructing a variable I refer
to as “strictness”.
To better understand the intuition underlying this empirical approach, consider the following
thought experiment. Suppose there are two nearly identical inventors A and B who apply to
the Patent Office with a claim to a new technology: “automobile parts”. The applications of
these two inventors are then routed by the Office to the relevant art unit: “vehicles”. Upon
reaching the art unit, the two applications by A and B are randomly assigned to two distinct
3https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/
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examiners 1 and 2 respectively. 1 is a less “strict” examiner i.e. she is more likely to grant
a patent on average, while 2 is less likely to approve the patent i.e. she is stricter. In such
a scenario, the likelihood of A’s patent application being approved increases, with the reverse
holding true for B. In this example, being assigned to a lenient or a strict examiner effectively
randomizes the success or failure of an application.
A 2SLS estimation with strictness as an instrumental variable approximates this thought
experiment. Following Farre-Mensa et al. (2020), I estimate the first-stage of this 2SLS analysis
in A.2. Here, I show that strictness is a credible instrument with a strong first stage, directly
influencing the patent rejection rate. Additionally, as shown in A.3, being assigned to a stricter
examiner is not affected by any inventor or examiner characteristic. I formalize my empirical
approach in equation 3.1:
Inventoroutcomeijfat + k = β1E[Patentrejection|Firstactiondecision]ijfat
+β2E[Patentrejection|Firstactiondecision]ijfat × Genderi + β3Genderi+
ϕXijfat + νaτ + ϵijfat+k
(3.1)
where i refers to the first-time applicant inventor, j the firm which is employing the inventor,
f examiners, a art units, and τ application year. t is the year of the first-action date. Following
Farre-Mensa et al. (2020), I use the first-action date rather than the filing or grant date as
the choice of a starting point to measure outcomes of rejection. This is mainly because the
first-action letter contains detailed information indicating whether the application might be
approved, thereby, affecting the behavior of the applicant.
The main coefficient of interest is β2 which the measures the differences in outcomes be-
tween female and male first-time inventors who get rejected. A central identifying assumption
underlying the analysis in equation 3.1 is that applicants and examiners are matched randomly.
The only influence that the applicant has over the patent prosecution process is the technology
of the patent and the time to file the patent. Therefore, I always include νaτ - examiner art unit
× application year fixed effects. Xijfat is the vector of control variables. I provide a complete
list of variable definitions in Appendix A.1.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports the baseline results. Panel A examines gender differences in the probability of
being dismissed from employment when an inventor’s first patent is rejected. Panel B studies
whether an employee who is fired by her initial firm, then gains employment at another firm.
Panel C considers whether a rejection is likely to affect exit from innovation. Employment (or
dismissal) is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the inventor is employed (or not) at
the firm for at least 12 months, and zero otherwise. All first-stage regressions include art unit
× application year fixed effects and the second-stage regressions include the number of claims
72
as a control variable. Standard errors are clustered at the art unit level.
The results highlight asymmetries in the employment-related career outcomes of male and
female inventors. While firms do not dismiss inventors immediately after failure, the effect is
both significant and economically sizable upon considering longer time horizons. Specifically,
female inventors who receive rejection are are 9 p.p. more likely to be fired within three
years after the first-action date. This effect is economically large at 64% (=9/14%) of the
unconditional mean rate of dismissal. This gap in dismissal is persistent, increasing further to
9.1 p.p. upon considering the first five years.
The estimates in Panel B uncover a similar disparity in being re-hired by the same or
another firm, conditional upon being dismissed by the initial firm. Taken together, Panels
A and B reflect large and persistent gaps not only within the outcomes at the first place of
employment but also for further labor market outcomes.
Panel C indicates that these effects extend to exit from innovation, wherein rejected female
inventors are 9.3 p.p. more likely to stop producing innovative output in comparison to their
male counterparts. In other words, a female inventor is about 155% (=9.3/6%) more likely to
exit innovation when her application is rejected as a result of being randomly assigned to a
stricter examiner, compared to the average inventor.
In addition to dismissing or “firing” employees, firms might potentially withhold resources
or promotions from underperforming employees. While I do not directly observe the resource
allocation within the firm, I study an important yet related outcome variable in Table 3: co-
authorship with other inventors in the firm. Innovation is rarely produced by individual inven-
tors, with teams being a first-order human capital resource in firms. Hence, co-authors provide
an important proxy for the resources available to the inventor in producing further innovation.
(Baghai et al., 2018).
Panel A indicates that rejected female inventors also produce innovation with fewer coau-
thors as compared to their male counterparts. More strikingly, this effect is observed in data
immediately with number of co-authors per patent dropping by 0.122 for female inventors.
While this might seem like a modest effect, the mean number of inventors filing an application
in my sample including the focal inventor herself is 1.5, so the drop in coauthors corresponds
to a decrease in resources of 25% = (0.122/0.5 × 100). The magnitude of this effect further
increases to 0.18 or 34% of the unconditional mean of coauthors over 5 years after rejection.
In Panel B, I analyze whether this effect is driven exclusively by a decline in male co-
authors. Though the decline in female co-authors is much smaller at 3% = (0.005/0.14 × 100),
it is nonetheless significant. Importantly, upon failing in their initial patent application, female
inventors see a reduction in collaborations with both male and female colleagues.
In Panel C, I find that female patent applicants are less likely to receive lead position on
patent applications after failure. While the ordering of names on a patent is not necessarily
linked to greater monetary compensation, it is the result of discussion between co-authors, with
the author with the most contribution typically receiving the lead position (Seymore, 2006).
Thereby, the estimates from Panel C are informative from perspective of relative position of
the inventors in her team.
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Overall, the results presented so far strongly support the interpretation that male and female
inventors experience different degrees of punishment when faced with rejection on their initial
applications.
3.4.2 Effect of Rejection on Treatment of Other Female Inventors
My results on employment and co-authorship outcomes show that female inventors face a larger
penalty compared to their male counterparts, even when rejection is “as-good-as-random” i.e.
exogenous to the underlying quality of the application as well as the applicant. Yet, these
results cannot fully indicate whether the documented outcomes are caused by discriminatory
‘punishment’ for failure by the firm or reduced effort by the inventor in face of rejection.
In order to better interpret the results presented so far, I construct a direct test of differential
treatment by the firm using a subsample of startups whose first patent applications had a
lead female inventor. Specifically, I compare the startups whose female-led first applications
were rejected with those where the initial applications succeeded, and analyze their subsequent
decisions vis-à-vis the female inventors who were not on the initial applicant team. This test
is based on two sets of evidence from prior literature. First, individuals use salient success
or failure of one member of a social group to update their beliefs about all members of that
group (Reuben et al., 2014; Okonofua & Eberhardt, 2015; Sarsons, 2017). Second, startups’
first patent applications are especially important to their long-term success in raising venture
capital or going public via an initial public offering (IPO) and therefore, serves as a salient
reference point that the firm might use to update its beliefs (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020).
I thereby estimate a variation of equation (3.1) aggregated at the startup level:
Decisionfjat+k = β1E[Patentrejection|Firstactiondecision]fjat+ϕXfjat+νaτ +ϵfjat+k (3.2)
where the main outcome variable is the decision by the startup f in year t + k, k years
after the date of first action by examiner j in art unit a. All other variables are as defined in
equation 3.1.
As the first outcome variable, I look at the percentage of female inventors hired out of all
inventors hired by the firm. In other words, I examine the choice of successful and unsuccessful
firms within this subsample to hire female vs. male inventors after their initial application.
Next, I follow the same intuition and consider the percentage of female inventors fired out of all
those who are fired. It is relevant to note that the estimation in Panel B exclude those inventors
who are on the team filing the initial patent application. Finally, I examine the percentage of
applications with female employees listed as primary or lead inventors.
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation 3.2. All three outcome variables indicate
that in startups where female-led teams fail, the outcomes for other female employees also
worsen. Ceteris paribus, firms with failed applications hire fewer female inventors compared to
male inventors, fire more female employees, and choose fewer female inventors as lead inventors
on their applications. In sum, the evidence from Table 4 lends more credence to an explanation
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based on firm changing its treatment rather than inventors adjusting their effort, as inventors
not directly linked to the initial rejection face more negative effects as well.
3.4.3 Independent Inventors
So far, the evidence suggests that female inventors are punished by their employers for “as-good-
as-random” failures to a greater extent than men. However, to further rule out the explanation
that these results cannot be explained by reduced effort by female inventors upon receiving a
rejection, I conduct an additional subsample analysis on inventors not affiliated with any firm
i.e. “independent inventors”. The conjecture underlying this analysis is that if the observed
gender gap in outcomes is driven by inventor-level factors such as gender differences in risk
preferences, this reduction must also be reflected in the subsample of independent inventors.
I begin by constructing a subsample of inventors defined as independent if their initial
application is not assigned to any firm. After identifying approximately 150,000 such inventors, I
filter the sample to focus on rejections (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020) and removing any observations
containing missing variables for the main dependent variables. My final sample, thus, consists
of 51,612 unique observations. For this analysis, I focus on four main variables measured over
the first five years from the first-action date: exit from innovation, probability of being hired,
number of co-authors, and the probability of being a lead inventor on an application.
Table 5 presents the results. As hypothesized, I find that independent female inventors are
not any likelier to exit innovation compared to male inventors. Similarly, while women are
unconditionally less likely to be hired by firms, there is no gender difference in the probability
of entering employment with a firm conditioning upon rejection. Finally, independent female
inventors neither experience a significant drop in the number of co-authors, nor are less likely
to be lead inventors on future patent applications.
While the two subsample analyses provide considerable evidence that differences in how
firms treat male and female employees is likelier to explain the results, it is important to
introduce the caveat that selection into neither samples is exogenous. Nonetheless, the above
results strongly suggest that decisions by the firm play a key role in introducing the gender gap
in outcomes after initial failure.
3.4.4 Firm and Inventor-level Characteristics
To further lend credence to the argument that the worse career outcomes faced by women are
driven by firm-level factors as opposed to inventor-level decisions, I conduct two additional
tests which exploit the heterogeneity in firm and inventor characteristics. Specifically, I use two
measures of conservatism, one which varies at the firm-level and other which mainly varies at
the inventor-level.
First, I consider whether adverse career outcomes after failure are observed for inventors
working in firms with a more gender egalitarian culture. Specifically, I use the measure of a
firm’s “sexist culture” as defined by (Lins et al., 2020), with the presence of a female executive
among the company’s most highly-paid executives being a proxy for firm sexism. I term this
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measure Egalitarian, with the variable being equal to one if at least one of the top five highest
paid executives is a women, and zero otherwise. The data on the board composition of firms,
gender of the executives therein, and their compensation is obtained from BoardEx and Exe-
cucomp databases and I am able to construct this measure for 1,315 publicly listed firms in my
sample. As shown by (Lins et al., 2020), firms which score high on this measure earned positive
excess returns during the #MeToo movement and in the aftermath of revelation of the Harvey
Weinstein scandal.
Thereafter, I consider an inventor-level factor which might affect the response of female
inventors to failure, namely, whether the inventor resides in the Southern United States. Indi-
viduals in the Southern US have been shown to have more traditional views of gender norms
(D’Acunto, 2019). Given that social norms play a key role in whether women persist after
initial failure (Gneezy et al., 2009), I conjecture that female inventors from these states might
be more likely to voluntary leave employment and exit innovation. Thus, this measure would
allow me to study the role of female risk-aversion in adverse career outcomes observed.
Panels A and B of Table 6 report the results. In this Table, I re-estimate the baseline
specification in (3.1) with measures of conservatism as an additional interaction terms. I find
that female inventors in more egalitarian firms are significantly less likely to experience job sep-
aration as compared to those in less egalitarian firms in three and five years after initial patent
rejection. By contrast, female inventors residing in Southern US, as compared to elsewhere in
the US, are not less likely to experience dismissals. This result is striking given that female in-
ventors in the South are unconditionally more likely to experience job dismissals. These results
further support my interpretation that the differential dismissal from employment is driven by
firm-level factors as opposed to individual-level factors.
3.4.5 Effect on Innovative Output
Finally, I attempt to quantify the decline in productivity of female inventors who receive re-
jections on their initial patent applications. Table 7 reports the estimates of equation 3.1 with
measures of quantity and quality of the innovative output as the dependent variables. In all
columns, the dependent variables are the average values per year over the first five years after
the first-action date.
The results in Table 7 highlight the decline in patenting activity by female inventors. I find
that there is an economically sizable decline in the quantity of innovation with the number of
applications and patents filed by the inventor declining by 17% (=4/23 × 100) and 54% (=7/13
× 100) relative to the unconditional means. In the next four columns, I consider measures of
patent quality. In column (3), I document a large and persistent decline in the number of
forward citations received by the inventors’ patents. The measures in columns (4), (5), and (6)
are strongly correlated with the value of the patent and are aimed at measuring breakthrough
technologically novel innovations. Here, I find a similar reduction in the generality, originality,
and number of highly cited or “top ten” patents, produced by the inventor.
Overall, these estimates point to a sizable decline in female inventors’ innovative output
resulting from assignment to a stricter examiner on the first patent.
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3.5 Conclusion
I document gender differences in punishment of creative failures. Using a detailed dataset that
covers the universe of first-time inventors applying to the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, I show that firms are more likely to fire female inventors for near-random rejections. My
empirical approach uses the random assignment of patents to examiners, thus ensuring that
differences in quality of patents cannot explain the results. I additionally find that employees
of the firm also punish female inventors by reducing co-authorships. Using two subsample
analyses, I provide suggestive evidence that the gap stems from firm actions than from decreased
inventor effort. Furthermore, I find that women who fail in their first-time applications reduce
their overall innovative output and are more likely to exit innovation.
The pervasiveness of creative tasks in workplaces implies that reduced tolerance for female
creative failures might limit the participation of women in creative and scientific fields including
academia. This gender gap in punishment might also have ramifications for the scope of activ-
ities that women undertake when they participate in these fields. This avenue is particularly




This table presents summary statistics for the main variables. The sample consists of all inventors who
applied for a patent for the first time between 1st November 2001 and 28th February 2013. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.1.
N Mean Std. Dev.
Patent rejected 985,437 0.36 0.48
Female 985,437 0.16 0.42
Strictness 985,437 0.33 0.21
Patent Scope 627,901 3.30 3.0
Career Outcomes
Dismissed from employment
1 year 985,437 0.05 0.15
3 years 877,061 0.15 0.34
5 years 824,437 0.29 0.60
Dismissed and re-hired
1 year 985,437 0.11 0.30
3 years 877,061 0.31 0.59
5 years 824,437 0.35 0.78
Exit from innovation
1 year 985,437 0.04 0.04
3 years 877,061 0.06 0.13
5 years 824,437 0.12 0.20
Co-authorship
Co-authorship with inventors in firm
1 year 985,437 0.52 1.49
3 years 877,061 0.78 1.65






N Mean Std. Dev.
Co-authorship with female inventors in firm
1 year 985,437 0.14 0.21
3 years 877,061 0.14 0.30
5 years 824,437 0.09 0.20
Lead inventor on patent
1 year 985,437 0.64 0.14
3 years 877,061 0.48 0.09
5 years 824,437 0.77 0.40
Innovative Output
No. of applications 824,437 0.23 1.18
No. of patents 824,437 0.13 0.82
Forward citations 824,437 0.02 0.27
Generality 533,262 0.030 0.18
Originality 533,262 0.028 0.19
Top Ten 533,262 0.00 0.04
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TABLE 2
Gender Differences in Career Outcomes after Failure
This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.1) as a linear probability model with job dismissal,
dismissal and re-hiring, and exit from innovation as the dependent variables respectively. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are
clustered at the art unit level.
1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A: Dismissed from employment
Patent rejected × female 0.009 0.090 0.091
(1.15) (3.09) (3.11)
Patent rejected 0.029 0.035 0.043
(0.56) (1.40) (1.50)
Female 0.008 0.032 0.051
(2.01) (2.15) (2.03)
N 353,457 327,654 291,612
R2 0.78 0.69 0.71
Panel B: Dismissed and re-hired
Patent rejected × female -0.013 -0.009 -0.001
(-0.90) (-1.94) (-2.14)
Patent rejected -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.31) (0.89) (0.89)
Female -0.029 -0.034 -0.042
(-2.20) (-9.09) (-9.49)
N 353,457 327,654 291,612
R2 0.55 0.24 0.41
Panel C: Exit from innovation
Patent rejected × female 0.005 0.093 0.093
(1.58) (2.42) (2.44)
Patent rejected 0.034 0.038 0.039
(1.00) (1.40) (1.44)
Female 0.106 0.107 0.111
(7.21) (7.33) (6.52)
N 353,457 327,654 291,612
R2 0.68 0.55 0.61
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TABLE 3
Gender Differences in Co-Authorships after Rejection
This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.1) with co-authorship with other inventors in
the firm, co-authorship with female inventors in the firm, and being a lead inventor as the dependent
variables respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses,
are based on standard errors that are clustered at the art unit level.
1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A: Co-authorship with inventors in firm
Patent rejected × female -0.122 -0.124 -0.180
(-1.68) (-1.98) (-1.85)
Patent rejected 0.204 0.348 0.219
(0.48) (0.24) (0.51)
Female -0.109 -0.142 -0.403
(-1.99) (-3.12) (-2.04)
N 328,715 292,556 275,003
R2 0.29 0.45 0.48
Panel B: Co-authorship with female inventors in firm
Patent rejected × female -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(-1.83) (-1.66) (-1.90)
Patent rejected 0.025 0.031 0.024
(1.03) (1.11) (1.05)
Female 0.021 0.030 0.030
(0.44) (0.52) (0.43)
N 328,715 292,556 275,003
R2 0.05 0.08 0.05
Panel C: Lead inventor on patent
Patent rejected × female -0.112 -0.140 -0.140
(-3.40) (-4.12) (-4.13)
Patent rejected -0.005 -0.008 -0.009
(-1.39) (-1.52) (-1.52)
Female -0.150 -0.166 -0.166
(-5.59) (-5.98) (-6.01)
N 328,715 292,556 275,003
R2 0.34 0.41 0.41
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TABLE 4
Effect of Failure on Treatment of Other Female Inventors
This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.2) to examine the effect of a failure of the first
patent application by a startup on its subsequent decisions with respect to hiring and dismissing male
and female inventors, and assigning male and female inventors to lead its applications. The equation
is estimated on a subsample of startups whose first patent application has a female lead inventor. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors
that are clustered at the art unit level.
1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A: Subsequent hires
Patent rejected -0.007 -0.004 -0.009
(-2.78) (-2.98) (-3.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 3,440 3,440 3,440
R2 0.68 0.70 0.72
Panel B: Subsequent dismissals
Patent rejected 0.029 0.010 0.003
(1.89) (1.03) (1.38)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 3,440 3,440 3,440
R2 0.55 0.59 0.60
Panel C: Female lead inventors
Patent rejected -0.029 -0.050 -0.034
(-1.87) (-1.90) (-1.35)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 3,440 3,440 3,440
R2 0.35 0.35 0.48
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TABLE 5
Gender Differences in Effect of Failure on Independent Inventors
This table estimates equation (3.1) with exit from innovation, probability of being hired, number of
co-authors, and the probability of being a lead inventor as dependent variables for a sub-sample of
independent inventors. Dependent variables are measured with over the first five years from the first-
office action date. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are
based on standard errors that are clustered at the art unit level.
Exit from
innovation
Hired Co-authorship Lead inventor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Patent rejected × fe-
male
0.010 0.003 -0.091 -0.090
(1.57) (0.13) (-1.22) (-1.63)
Patent rejected 0.086 -0.008 0.047 0.001
(2.49) (-1.92) (0.95) (0.04)
Female 0.210 -0.002 -0.186 -0.003
(10.39) (2.88) (-3.10) (-1.75)
N 51,612 51,612 51,612 51,612
R2 0.69 0.44 0.38 0.35
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TABLE 6
Interaction with Measures of Conservatism
This table reports the results of estimating equation (3.1) as a linear probability model with measures of
firm-level and individual-level conservatism as interaction terms, and job dismissal as the main dependent
variable. All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors that are clustered at the art unit level.
Dismissed from employment
1 year 3 years 5 years
Panel A: Egalitarian
Patent rejected × female × egalitarian -0.092 -0.238 -0.505
(-0.70) (-2.24) (-2.11)
Female -0.003 0.004 -0.208
(-0.20) (0.24) (-0.08)
Patent rejected 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.63) (0.32) (0.82)
Female 0.014 0.015 0.023
(2.06) (2.55) (2.78)
Female × egalitarian 0.080 0.004 0.075
(0.68) (0.37) (1.62)
Patent rejected × egalitarian 0.006 0.067 0.142
(0.28) (0.47) (0.51)
N 193,502 152,441 110,305
R2 0.39 0.43 0.57
Panel B: Southern inventor
Patent rejected × female × southern inventor -0.039 -0.075 -0.085
(-0.71) (-1.03) (-0.27)
Southern inventor 0.059 0.067 0.085
(0.68) (0.37) (0.60)
Patent rejected 0.010 0.003 0.011
(1.50) (0.15) (0.32)
Female 0.003 0.062 0.157
(2.16) (2.48) (4.04)
Female × southern inventor 0.087 0.093 0.106
(0.67) (2.25) (2.46)
Patent rejected × southern inventor 0.005 0.009 0.002
(0.40) (1.93) (2.14)
N 353,457 327,654 291,612
R2 0.32 0.52 0.77
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TABLE 7
Effect of Failure on Innovative Output by Female Inventors
This table estimates equation 3.1 with measures of innovative output i.e. number of applications, number
of patents, forward citations, generality, originality, and top ten cited patents as dependent variables.
Dependent variables are the average values per year over the first five years after the first-action date.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard







Generality Originality Top Ten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent rejected × fe-
male
-0.040 -0.070 -0.148 -0.093 -0.139 -0.109
(-9.21) (-3.09) (-1.93) (-2.09) (-1.66) (-8.90)
Patent rejected -0.110 -0.425 -0.202 -0.563 -0.087 -0.115
(-11.53) (-5.10) (-3.34) (-1.89) (-4.21) (-2.48)
Female -0.089 -0.310 -0.086 -0.160 -0.102 -0.099
(-10.66) (-2.46) (-1.45) (-3.03) (-4.98) (-7.39)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 275,003 275,003 275,003 275,003 275,003 275,003
R2 0.54 0.49 0.13 0.30 0.39 0.15
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Appendix 3.A Variable Descriptions
TABLE A.1
Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable name Description Source
Dependent variables
Patent rejected An indicator variable equal to one if an application did not
result in a successful patent grant and zero otherwise.
PatEx
Strictness Number of patent applications rejected by the examiner
divided by the number of applications reviewed, prior to
the focal application
PatEx
Female An indicator variable equal to one if the inventor is classi-
fied by the matching algorithm as a female and zero other-
wise. See Section 3.2.2 for details of the process for match-











Dismissed from employment An indicator variable equal to one if the inventor does not
submit an application with the firm as an assignee for at
least 12 consecutive months between year of first action t





Dismissed and re-hired An indicator variable equal to one if the inventor is dis-
missed from her initial firm and then, submits more than 2
applications with another firm between year of first action





Exit from innovation An indicator variable equal to one if the inventor does not
submit an application for at least 24 consecutive months
between year of first action t and year t + k, where k =





Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable name Description Source
Co-authorship
Co-authorship with inventors in
firm
Number of co-authors who are employed at the same firm
f as the inventor i, divided by the number of applications
filed by inventor i between year of first action t and year
t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years. Employment at a firm is
defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the inventor
does not submit an application with the firm as an assignee
for at least 12 consecutive months between year of first






Lead inventor on patent Number of applications on which the inventor is the “lead”
inventor or the first inventor, divided by the total number
of applications filed by the inventor i between year of first
action t and year t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years.
PatEx
Co-authorship with female in-
ventors in firm
Number of female co-authors who are employed at the same
firm f as the inventor i, divided by the number of applica-
tions filed by inventor i between year of first action t and
year t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years. Employment at a firm
is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the in-
ventor does not submit an application with the firm as an
assignee for at least 12 consecutive months between year







Egalitarian An indicator variable equal to one if at least one of the top








Southern inventor An indicator variable equal to one if the inventor resides
in a state which is a part of region Southern United States








Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable name Description Source
Innovative Output
No. of applications Number of patent applications filed by inventor i between
year of first action t and year t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years.
PatEx
No. of patents Number of patents granted to inventor i between year of
first action t and year t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years.
PatEx
Forward citations Number of citations received by the inventor i’s patents
in the five years after grant date divided by the number of
patents granted to the inventor between year of first action
t and year t + k, where k = 1, 3, 5 years.
PatentsView
Generality One minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the
forward citations to the given patent, where the HHI is
calculated over the four-digit International Patent Classi-
fication (IPC) classes, divided by number of patents issued
to the inventor i between year of first action t and year t+k,
where k = 1, 3, 5 years. Generality is normalized by the av-
erage generality score for all the other patents granted in
the same year and belonging to the same 3-digit technology
class.
PatentsView
Originality One minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the
backward citations to the given patent, where the HHI is
calculated over the four-digit International Patent Classi-
fication (IPC) classes, divided by number of patents issued
to the inventor i between year of first action t and year t+k,
where k = 1, 3, 5 years. Originality is normalized by the
average originality score for all the other patents granted






Variable Definitions and Sources
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable name Description Source
Top Ten Number of a worker’s patents that end up in the top 10%
among all patents from the same year and 3-digit USPTO
technology class.
PatentsView
Subsample: Start-up firms with female lead inventors on first application
Subsequent hires Number of female inventors hired by the firm between years
t and t + 5 divided by the number of total inventors hired
by the firm during the same time period. An inventor i
is classified as “hired” in year t if she did not assign a
patent to any firm previously and then, assigned more than





Subsequent dismissals Number of female inventors dismissed from the firm be-
tween years t and t + 5 divided by the number of total
inventors hired by the firm during the same time period.
Dismissal is an indicator variable equal to one if the in-
ventor does not submit an application with the firm as an





Female lead inventors Number of female inventors who are lead inventors on the
firm f ’s applications divided by the number of total ap-
plications filed by the firm between years t and t + 5. A







Hired An inventor i is classified as “hired” in year t if she did not
assign a patent to any firm previously and then, assigned
more than 2 patent applications to the firm f between years







Instrumental Variable: First-Stage Results
This table reports the results of estimating the first-stage equation of the 2SLS analysis, wherein the
first stage regresses the final abandonment or rejection of the given patent on the prior rejection rate
of the patent examiner. Claims is equal to the natural logarithm of the number of independent claims
in the patent at the time of initial filing. Examiner experience is the natural logarithm of number of
applications reviewed by the examiner prior to the focal application. Examiner grades are the official
positions or “grades” of the examiners within the USPTO, with grades ranging from 9 (lowest) to 15
(highest). All other variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are
based on standard errors that are clustered at the art unit level.
First patent application rejected?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rejection rate 0.052 0.051 0.055 0.039 0.039











Examiner grade GS-9 0.005
(0.01)
Examiner grade GS-11 0.001
(0.04)
Examiner grade GS-12 0.001
(0.16)
Examiner grade GS-13 0.003
(0.05)
Examiner grade GS-14 0.000
(0.000)
Examiner grade GS-15 0.000
(0.000)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology × year FE No No No Yes Yes
F-test: IV = 0 1034.19 1148.91 782.14 550.14 421.30
N 984,650 983,333 984,650 996,985 996,986




The table reports the results of regressing the rejection rate of the examiner on the characteristics of
the inventor, the application, or the examiner. Claims is equal to the natural logarithm of the number
of independent claims in the patent at the time of initial filing. Examiner experience is the natural
logarithm of number of applications reviewed by the examiner prior to the focal application. Examiner
grades are the official positions or “grades” of the examiners within the USPTO, with grades ranging
from 9 (lowest) to 15 (highest). All other variables are defined in Appendix A.1. t-statistics, reported
in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the art unit level.
Instrumental variable: Examiner strictness











Examiner grade GS-9 -0.001
(-2.42)
Examiner grade GS-11 -0.004
(-1.09)
Examiner grade GS-12 -0.005
(-4.13)
Examiner grade GS-13 -0.000
(-1.60)
Examiner grade GS-14 -0.011
(-1.92)
Examiner grade GS-15 -0.013
(-1.81)
Art unit × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology × year FE No No No Yes
N 983,333 984,650 984,650 996,986
R2 0.53 0.70 0.66 0.89
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627 Richard Heuver Applications of liquidity risk discovery 
using financial market infrastructures 
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628 Mohammad Nasir 
Nasiri 
Essays on the Impact of Different 
Forms of Collaborative R&D on 
Innovation and Technological Change  
978 90 5668 
629 1 
August 2020 




630 Roland van de Kerkhof It’s about time: Managing 
implementation dynamics of condition-
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631 Constant Pieters Process Analysis for Marketing 
Research 
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633 Olivier David Armand 
Zerbib 
Asset pricing and impact investing with 
pro-environmental preferences 





634 Laura Capera Romero Essays on Competition, Regulation and 
Innovation in the Banking Industry 




635 Elisabeth Beusch Essays on the Self-Employed in the 
Netherlands and Europe 




636 Sophie Zhou Essays on the Self-Employed in the 
Netherlands and Europe 




637 Vincent Peters Turning modularity upside down: 
Patient-centered Down syndrome care 
from a service modularity perspective 




638 Pranav Desai Essays in Corporate Finance and 
Innovation 





This Ph.D. dissertation consists of three independent chapters in corporate finance 
and innovation. The first chapter studies how in-group biases of patent examiners - 
an important set of regulators - affect their decisions to grant patents. Additionally, 
it highlights the costs of these biased decisions for inventors, startups, and the 
economy. The second chapter studies how limited investor attention affects analyst 
coverage of firms and thereby, information provision to the financial markets. The 
last chapter documents that firms punish female inventors for their “as-good-as-
random” creative failures more harshly than they punish men. These differences 
in punishment cause early-stage female inventors to exit innovation at higher rates 
than their male colleagues.  
Pranav PradeeP desai (Mumbai, India, 1990), received his Bachelor’s Degree in 
Commerce from University of Mumbai, and then a Master’s Degree in Finance and 
a Master’s Degree in Economics from Lancaster University and University College 
London respectively. He began his Research Master in Finance at Tilburg University 
in 2015, supported by the CentER scholarship, before starting his PhD in 2016. In fall 
2020, he joined the Department of Finance at Nova School of Business and Economics 
as an Assistant Professor.
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